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Abstract
This Comment argues that the European Court of Justice (”ECJ”) should choose not to follow
its holding that Regulation 990/93 applied to the aircraft that Bosphorus leased from Yugoslavian
National Airline (”JAT”), because it is not clear that the language of Resolution 820 and Regulation 990/93 provides for the impounding of aircrafts whose Yugoslavian owner leased them to
non-Yugoslavian businesses in which no Yugoslavian entity has a majority or controlling interest.
This Comment further argues that in so holding, the ECJ violated Bosphorus’ fundamental right
to property because the impounding of the aircraft was disproportionate to the concrete purpose of
preventing Yugoslavia and Yugoslavian nationals from having recourse to aircrafts that they could
use to violate the embargo. Part I discusses the structure of the European Community and sources
of fundamental rights in Community law, specifically property rights, including important ECJ
and European Court of Human Rights property rights cases. Part I also presents the background
of the Bosphorus case, including the historical background of the war in Bosnia, the U.N. Security
Council Resolutions instituting the embargo on Yugoslavia, and the EC Council regulations implementing those resolutions. Part II discusses the procedural history and facts of the Bosphorus case,
including an analysis of the decisions of the Irish High Court (the “High Court”), the Advocate
General of the ECJ, and the ECJ. Part III advocates a more narrow and concrete interpretation of
Regulation 990/93, affording greater weight to Bosphorus’ property rights. This Comment concludes that the ECJ should adopt a more narrow and concrete interpretation of Regulation 990/93
and should refrain from following its holding that Regulation 990/93 did not apply to Bosphorus’s
aircraft, thereby further strengthening and clarifying the European Community’s commitment to
the protection of property rights.

COMMENT
THE BOSPHORUS CASE: THE BALANCING OF PROPERTY

RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN ENDING THE
WAR IN BOSNIA
Erik Drewniak*

INTRODUCTION
One of the international community's reactions to the war
raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina' ("Bosnia") since 1991 has been,
the imposition of an embargo' on the Republic of Yugoslavia
("Yugoslavia").'

Council4

Between 1991 and 1993, the U.N. Security

passed a series of sanctions against Yugoslavia designed

* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University. This Comment is dedicated to Svetla,
for her love and patience.
LEONARDJ. COHEN, BROKEN BONDS 236 (1994). Bosnia-Herzegovina ("Bosnia") is a
region in southeastern Europe populated mainly by Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. See id.
(discussing Bosnia's ethnic makeup). Tensions between the three ethnicities in Bosnia
worsened to the point where, in 1992, war broke out between Serb and Muslim forces.
See id. at 236-39 (describing political and ethnic situation in Bosnia at time when war
erupted).
2. See PAUL MoJZES, YuGoSLAvIA INFERNO 172-85 (1994) (characterizing reactions
of Europe and United States to war in Bosnia as indecisive, uninspired, and cautious,
while arguing that most consistent action of United Nations and European Community
has been its application of arms embargo).
3. BOGDAN DENITCH, ETHNIC NATIONALISM: THE TRAGIC DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA 22
(1994). Yugoslavia first came into existence as an independent state after World War I.
Id. That state was the product of the unification of the independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro with the South Slavic provinces, which had long been under Austro-Hungarian rule. Id. After World War II and under Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia became a Socialist federation consisting of six republics of equal status. See FRED SINGLETON, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES 207-09 (1985) (recounting early days
of post-World War II transition to Socialism). After the death of Tito, the Socialist
system in Yugoslavia disintegrated and gave way to disunity based in ethnic conflict. See
MOJzES, supra note 2, at 76-77 (discussing revival of ethnic strife after Tito's death).
During the 1980s and early 1990s, ethnic tensions erupted into skirmishes among
ethnicities in Croatia and the Kosovo region of Serbia, and then actual war in Slovenia,
Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. See id. at 95-107 (detailing progression of violent
clashes among ethnic groups in 1980s and 1990s Yugoslavia). The main ethnic groups
of Yugoslavia are Serbs, Croats, Slavic Muslims, and Montenegrins, but the population
also consists of Slovenes, Albanians, Macedonians, and Hungarians. DENITCH, supra, at
28-29.
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 23. The United Nations is an international organization of
states that fifty states formed to create and supervise some order in the world, to "de-
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to foster peace.5 These measures included an arms embargo6
and trade sanctions, 7 along with provisions for the freezing of
funds owned by or destined for Yugoslavian authorities or undertakings.' In addition to the U.N. sanctions, the European Comvelop friendly relations among nations," and "to maintain international peace and security...." Id. art. 1(1), 1(2). In San Francisco in April, 1945, representatives of those
fifty states drew up the U.N. Charter which consists of rules for an organization of states
and for the limits of action that their governments may take. PETER R. BAEHR & LEON
GORDENKER, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 1990S 1-3 (2nd ed. 1994). These rules take

the form of legal obligations which are binding on states and accepted as such by their
governments. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(2). The U.N. Security Council is a body within the
United Nations that has both permanent and non-permanent members. Id. art. 23(1).
Of all the various U.N organs, the Security Council has primary responsibility for "the
maintenance of international peace and security .... " Id. art. 24(1). The Security
Council has conciliatory and coercive powers. BAEHR & GORDENKER, supra, at 24. The
Security Council must exercise its powers only after the parties in a dispute have attempted to arrive at their own solution. U.N. CHARTER art. 37. If the Security Council
concludes that a situation constitutes a direct threat or breach of the peace, it can
immediately call on member governments to apply diplomatic and economic sanctions.
Id. arts. 39, 41. The member governments on whom the Security Council calls to carry
out its decisions then have a legal obligation to act in accordance with the Security
Council's demand. Id. art. 48; BAEHR & GORDENKER, supra, at 25. Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter authorizes the Security Council to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
5. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th Mtg., at 3, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713
(1991) [hereinafter Resolution 713] (imposing total arms embargo on Yugoslavia); S.C.
Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 3082nd Mtg., at 3-4, 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992) [hereinafter Resolution 757] (imposing total trade embargo on Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 787, U.N.
SCOR, 3137th Mtg., at 3, 1 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (1992) [hereinafter Resolution
787] (prohibiting transshipment through Yugoslavia of certain essential products and
defining Yugoslavian vessel for purposes of implementing relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 3200th Mtg., at 4-6, 11 13, 22, 24, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/820 (1993) [hereinafter Resolution 820] (strengthening U.N. embargo on Yugoslavia by prohibiting transport of all commodities across Yugoslavian border and by
providing for impounding of various types of vehicles in which Yugoslavian entity holds

majority or controlling interest); Sebastian Bohr, Sanctions by the United Nations Security
Council and the European Community, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 256, 260-62 (1993) (discussing
several major U.N. Security Council resolutions passed from 1991 to 1992 in response
to war in Bosnia); Lori Fisler Damrosch, ASIL Insight: Recent Security Council Conflicts:
Economic Sanctions, AM. SOCIETY INT'L L. NEWSL.,Jan., 1994, available in LEXIS, Interna-

tional Law Library, American Society of International Law Newsletter File, at 3-4 (discussing Security Council's adoption in 1993 of sanctions aimed specifically at Bosnian
Serbs).
6. See Resolution 713, supra note 5, at 3, 6 (instituting complete arms embargo
on Yugoslavia).
7. See Resolution 757, supra note 5, at 3-4, 4 (instituting total embargo on trade
with Yugoslavia).
8. See id. at 4, 1 5 (providing exception for "payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs .. ").
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munity9 passed, during approximately the same period, several
regulations' ° to implement the U.N. embargo. 1 The sanctions
2
caused the states bordering Yugoslavia to suffer economic loss,1
9. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by Treaty on European Union
[hereinafter TEU], Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M.
247 [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Br. T.S. No. 1
(Cmd. 5179-II) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended y Single European Act [hereinafter SEA], OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741, in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNrTIES (EC Offl Pub. Off. 1987). As of the signing of the TEU, the

term European Community replaces the term European Economic Community. TEU,
supra, art. G, OJ. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 728; P.S.R.F. MATHUSEN, A
GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 4 (1995).

In addition to the European Economic

Community ("EEC"), there is the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC") and
the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom"). Id. The EEC has, for all practical purposes, absorbed the ECSC and Euratom, which is why the singular form of the
term Community has become prevalent. Id. The TEU established the European
Union, which functions as a new chapter in the task of uniting the people of Europe
more closely. Id. at 3-4. The EEC, ECSC, and Euratom comprise the first of three
pillars that form the European Union, while the second and third pillars are, respectively, a Common Foreign and Security Policy and Co-operation in the areas ofjustice
and Home Affairs. Id. at 4. The 12 Member States that signed the TEU were Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. TEU, supra, pmbl., O.J. C 224/1, at 1
(1992), (1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 719. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden's acceded to
the European Union. Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: the ConstitutionalImpact of the Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1092, 1093
(1995).
10. PENELOPE KENT, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 24 (1992). A regulation sets out
general rules which apply uniformly throughout the European Community. Id. The
European Community's Council, Commission, and Parliament make regulations "[i]n
order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of [the EC Treaty]
.... " EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 189, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693. A regulation "shall
have general application... [and] shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all [EC] Member States." Id.
11. See Council Regulation No. 1432/92, art. 1, O.J. L 151/4 at 4 (1992), amended
by Oj. L 358/16 (1992) (subsequent citations will be to full text, English version, at O.J.
L 151/4 (1992)) (imposing trade embargo on Serbia and Montenegro); see also Council
Regulation No. 990/93, arts. 1-5, O.J. L 102/14 (1993), amended by Oj. L 1919/138
(1995) (subsequent citations will be to full text, English version, at O.J. L 102/14
(1992)) (strengthening trade embargo on Serbia and Montenegro); Bohr, supra note 5,
at 261-62 (tracking European Community's various measures concerning war in Bosnia
in 1991 and 1992 following U.N. Security Council Resolutions).
12. See Ian Black, Yugoslav Sanctions Bite Despite Loopholes; Disagreementover whether to
Reward Milosevic as Neighbours Suffer, GUARDIAN, May 20, 1993, at 10 (stating that sanctions against Yugoslavia were creating "mounting economic difficulties for neighboring
states [of Yugoslavia] . .. ."). The sanctions, and especially the embargo, caused the

economies of Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, and Albania to suffer
severe economic loss. See Official Estimate of Losses from New UN Sanctions on Yugoslavia,
BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION SUMMARY OF WoRLn BROADCASTS, May 6, 1993,
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and commentators have expressed doubt as to whether these
13
sanctions advanced the goal of peace.

The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution' 4 820'- in
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News File (reporting Bulgarian Government's
forecast that losses resulting from enforcement of sanctions against Yugoslavia would
exceed US$1.88 billion from May to December of 1993, and that sanctions had already
cost Bulgaria more than US$1.8 billion since their imposition); see also Slav Danev,
Crushing Losses, MACLEAN'S, February 14, 1994, at 4 (estimating, as Bulgarian Ambassador to Canada, that Bulgaria's losses from sanctions against Yugoslavia to have been
more than US$4 billion); Foreign Relations; Daskalov Addresses UN, Puts Forward Proposals
for Peace-keeping Operations, BRuTISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION SUMMARY OF WORLD

BROADCASTS, Oct. 3, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News File (reporting
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov's statement that sanctions had had a
great impact on Bulgaria's economy and that "[t]he burden of sanctions has gone beyond the mark of reasonable economic and social tolerance in Bulgaria . . .");
Romania, Serbia CallforEnd of Sanctions Against Yugoslavia, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Apr. 5,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News File (reporting Romanian President Ion Iliescu's statement that Romania had suffered more than US$8 billion in
losses from sanctions and that sanctions had "had disastrous effects on Romanian efforts to carry out economic reforms and industrial restructuring .... ."); Effects of UN
Sanctions on Yugoslavia Threat of Bankruptcyfor Solventul, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATON SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
World News File (stating that Romanian petrochemical company Solventul had lost
US$7.5 million and was facing bankruptcy due to sanctions, and that it dismissed approximately 2000 employees when its Yugoslav partner enterprise suspended supply of
chemical raw materials); Black, supra, at 4 (stating that Macedonia had "exported 80
percent of production to former Yugoslavia and transports all its goods through Serbia," and reporting that Macedonia had "warned that its very economic survival may be
at stake" due to effects of sanctions); Greek and BulgarianDeputy Foreign Ministers Hold
Talks in Athens, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
Sept. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News File (reporting that
Greece's economy had sustained damaging losses because of sanctions); Justin Burke,
Who's Bit by Serbia's Sanctions, CHRISTIAN SCi. MoNrrOR, May 18, 1994, at 24 (stating that
Hungary's loss of Yugoslavia as an export market because of sanctions cost it billions of
dollars in lost trade); Diplomats to Urge U.N. for Sanctions Compensations, REUTERS LIBRARY
REP., Aug. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News File (discussing
losses to Albanian economy due to embargo of Yugoslavia).
13. See MoJZES, supra note 2, at 182-85 (arguing that, for most part, U.N. sanctions
have failed to weaken authoritarian regime in Yugoslavia); see also MIHAILO CRNOBRNA,
THE YUGOSLAV DRAMA 212 (arguing that more than one year after United Nations imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia, they had not brought situation in Bosnia any closer to
solution). Scholars have argued that the sanctions have actually helped those in power,
for they can blame the country's economic problems on the international community
which instituted the sanctions. MOJZES, supra note 2, at 182-83; see CRNOBRNJA, supra, at
212 (stating that "there are strong arguments for [the position) that sanctions have
strengthened the hand of aggressive nationalists, and thus the drama on the ground").
Yet, one scholar points out that the sanctions have only harmed innocent Serbian civilians who have participated neither in the war nor in the black market which has become the main supplier of many basic goods. MoJZES, supra note 2, at 176-82.
14. JORGE CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 1 (1969).
In the general context of international organizations, resolutions are "expressions of

1997]

THE BOSPHORUS CASE

1011

1993, providing for the impounding of aircrafts in which a Yugoslavian entity has a majority or controlling interest.' 6 The European Community followed soon thereafter with Council Regulation 990/9317 ("Regulation 990/93"), seeking to implement particular measures set forth in the U.N. embargo.' Regulation
990/93 expresses the desire of the European Community and its
Member States to implement several of the U.N. embargo Resolutions, including Resolution 820, in the European Community
by means of an EC measure. 9 Regulation 990/93 also authorizes impoundings identical to those set forth in Resolution
820.20

The lack of explicit mention of fundamental rights21 in the
collective judgments" as well as the "normal vehicles for realizing the objectives of international bodies .... " Id. Resolutions are the result of these organizations' decisionmaking processes. Id. The question of the legal effects of the resolutions of U.N. bodies is complex. Id. at 4. U.N. resolutions that directly relate to the maintenance of
international peace and security produce legal effect that are binding on the members
of the United Nations. Id. at 71. Certain resolutions of the U.N. Security Council fall
into this category of resolutions. Id. Among these Security Council resolutions are decisions, which have binding force because their authority derives from the U.N. Charter. Id.
15. Resolution 820, supra note 5.
16. Id. at 6, 24. Resolution 820 also provides for the impounding of "all vessels,
freight vehicles [and] rolling stock" in which a Yugoslavian entity has such interest. Id.
17. Council Regulation 990/93, supra note 11.
18. Id., pmbl., O.J. L 102/14, at 14 (1993). The preamble to Regulation 990/93
does not explicitly state which of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions it is meant to
implement, although it expressly refers to Resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787
(1992), and 820 (1993). Id. The preamble to Regulation 990/93 states, "the Community and its Member States have agreed to have recourse to a Community instrument,
interalia, in order to ensure a uniform implementation throughout the Community of
certain of these measures," having referred to the resolutions in question two clauses
above this one. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id., art. 8, O.J. L 102/14, at 16 (1993) (providing for impounding of "aircraft
in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or
operating from [Yugoslavia] . .. ").
21. See Lars Bondo Krogsgaard, FundamentalRights in the European Community After
Maastricht, in 1 LEGAL IssuEs EUR. INTEGRATION 99, 100-01 (1993) (noting failure of
three founding treaties, including EEC Treaty, to mention any fundamental rights). In
general, fundamental rights are "all those legal rights and situations which must not be
violated by any action of the public authorities, whether by the legislature, the executive
or the judiciary .... " M. Hilf, The Protection of FundamentalRights in the Community, in
EUROPEAN LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL 145, 145 (F.G. Jacobs ed., 1976). In the European
Community, the European Court ofJustice ("ECJ") considers a right fundamental because of its "being necessary to achieve Community objectives." Carlos A. Ball, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Society: The Court of Justice, Social Policy, and Individual
Rights Under the European Community's Legal Order, 37 HARv.INT'L L.J. 307, 341. (1996).

1012

FORDHAM1NTERNTATIONAL LAWJOURNIAL

[Vol. 20:1007

three founding Community treaties2 2 has forced the European
Court ofJustice 3 ("ECJ") to base the recognition and protection
of fundamental rights on sources other than those treaties.2 4

The principles that the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 2 5 ("European

Human Rights Convention" or "Convention") articulates and
the constitutional provisions and traditions of the EC Member
States have functioned as those sources.

6

The ECJ includes

Thus, "the rights which the Court expressly designate[s] as fundamental Community
rights are available only subject to the objectives of Community law." Maurice Mendelson, The European Court of Justice and Human Rights, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 125, 159 (1981).
When interpreting the foundational provisions of the EC Treaty, the ECJ applies a form
of the principle of teleological utilitarianism, according to which a right is fundamental
if it helps to maximize a good. Ball, supra,at 341. In the case of the European Community, the good that the ECJ seeks to maximize is the "attainment and preservation of a
fully integrated free market economy." Id.
22. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Offl Pub. Off. 1987); Treaty Establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter Euratom
Treaty], as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNMES (EC OWl

Pub. Off. 1987); EEC Treaty, supra note 9.
23. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 164 [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684. The function of the
ECJ is to "ensure that in the interpretation and application of the law is observed." Id.
The ECJ provides a forum for the resolution of disputes between EC member states and
the European Community and between the institutions themselves, and also protects
individual rights. KENT, supra note 10, at 18. The EJ has "jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of [the EC Treaty]; (b) the validity and
interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community... [and] (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where those statues so
provide." EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 177 [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689. Where one of
these three kinds of questions "is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State,
that court or tribunal may... request the Court ofJustice to give a ruling thereon." Id.
The ECJ consists of 15 judges. Id., art. 165 [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684.
24. See Krogsgaard, supra note 21, at 100-01 (discussing evolution of fundamental
rights in ECJ case law). The ECJ has recognized the fundamental right to manifest
one's religion or beliefs. See Vivien Prais v. Council, Case 130/75, [1976] E.C.R 1589,
1597-98,
10-19 [1976] C.M.L.R. 708, 719-20 (acknowledging freedom of religion in
Community law). The EJ has also recognized the right to property. See Liselotte
Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, 3744-45, 11 17-20,
[1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42, 64-65 (articulating right to property guaranteed in Community
law). Another right that the ECJ has protected is the right to form and join trade
unions. See Henri Maurissen v. European Public Service Union, Cases C-193/87 and C13-15 (spelling out freedom of trade union activity
194/87, [1990] E.C.R. 1-95, 1-118,
in Community law).

25. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Human Rights Convention].

26. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3744, 17, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64; see TEU, supra
note 9, art. F(2), O.J. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 728 (providing that
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property rights2 7 among the fundamental rights protected in its
case law.28
The ECJ considered the application of Regulation 990/93
in a recent property rights case.2 9 In Bosphorus v. Minister, the
ECJ considered whether Regulation 990/93 applied to an aircraft that Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS ("Bosphorus"), a Turkish airline, leased from the Yugoslavian National Airline ('JAT").1° The ECJ concluded that Bosphorus' aircraft did fall under the scope of Article 8 of Regulation 990/9331
providing for the impounding of aircrafts in which
a Yugoslavian
32
entity holds a majority or controlling interest.
This Comment argues that the ECJ should choose not to
follow its holding that Regulation 990/93 applied to the aircraft
that Bosphorus leased from JAT, because it is not clear that the
language of Resolution 820 and Regulation 990/93 provides for
the impounding of aircrafts whose Yugoslavian owner leased
"[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms... and as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of common law.").
27. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3749, 1 29, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 68. The EC protects
property rights in the European Community by rendering judgments that interpret
Community measures so as to ensure that the measures do not violate property rights.
See id. (concluding that Council Regulation prohibiting new plantings of vines did "not
entail any undue limitation upon the exercise of the right to property.").
28. See id., [1979] E.C.R. at 3744, 1 17, [1980] 3 C.M.LR. at 64 (asserting that right
to property is guaranteed in European Community).
29. See Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transport,
Energy and Communications, Ireland and Another, Case C-84/95, [1996] E.C.R. I3953, 27, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 257, 296 [hereinafter Bosphorus] (holding that Regulation 990/93 applied to aircraft that its Yugoslav owner had leased to non-Yugoslav undertaking in which no Yugoslav entity had majority or controlling interest).
30. Id. at 1-3980,
1-3, [1996] C.M.L.R. at 291-92.
31. Council Regulation No. 990/93, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. L 102/14, at 14
(1993). Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 states:
All vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in which a majority or
controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be impounded by the competent authorities of the Member States.
Expenses of impounding vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft
may be charged to their owners.
Id.
32. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3987, 27, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 296. Article 8 of
Council Regulation 990/93 provides for the impounding of aircrafts in which a Yugoslavian entity holds a "majority or controlling interest." Council Regulation No. 990/
93, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. L 102/14, at 14 (1993).
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them to non-Yugoslavian businesses in which no Yugoslavian entity has a majority or controlling interest. This Comment further
argues that in so holding, the ECJ violated Bosphorus' fundamental right to property because the impounding of the aircraft
was disproportionate to the concrete purpose of preventing Yugoslavia and Yugoslavian nationals from having recourse to aircrafts that they could use to violate the embargo. Part I discusses
the structure of the European Community and sources of funda-

mental rights in Community law, specifically property rights, in3
cluding important ECJ and European Court of Human Rights
property rights cases. Part I also presents the background of the
Bosphorus case, including the historical background of the war in
Bosnia, the U.N. Security Council Resolutions instituting the embargo on Yugoslavia, and the EC Council regulations implementing those resolutions. Part II discusses the procedural history
and facts of the Bosphorus case, including an analysis of the decisions of the Irish High Court3 4 (the "High Court"), the Advocate General of the ECJ,3 and the ECJ. Part III advocates a
33. See European Human Rights Convention, supra note 25, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S.
at 234 (providing for creation of European Court of Human Rights). The European
Court of Human Rights ("CHR") issues decisions on issues concerning CHRjurisdiction and the interpretation and application of the Convention's substantive provisions.
J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF

HUMAN RiCHTs 8-9 (1993).
34. HENRY MURDOCH, A DICTIONARY OF IRISH LAw 235 (1988). The Irish High
Court is the court in the Irish legal system that hears appeals from the Circuit Court,
which hears appeals from the District Court, the lowest court in the Irish legal hierarchy. Id. at 90, 166. The High Court "is invested with full original jurisdiction in and
power to determine all matters and questions whether of law or fact, civil or criminal."
Id. at 235. Appeals from the High Court are to the Irish Supreme Court. Id. Bosphorus applied to the High Court for judicial review of the impounding of its aircraft. See
Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Minister for Transport,
Energy and Communications, Ireland and Attorney General and TEAM Aer Lingus
Ltd, [1994] 2 I.L.R.M. 551, 553, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 464, 465 (High Court of Ireland,
Murphy, J.) (stating issue in Bosphorus case). The High Court held that the Irish official
who had impounded the aircraft had acted beyond his authorized powers. Id. at 560,
[1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 472.
35. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 166, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685. Nine Advocates
General currently assist the ECJ by making, "in open court, reasoned submissions on
cases brought before the Court ofJustice, in order to assist the Court in the performance of the task assigned to it [under the EC Treaty]." Id. The Irish Minister who had
impounded Bosphorus' aircraft appealed the Irish High Court's judgment to the
Supreme Court of Ireland, which referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, a question concerning the interpretation of Regulation 990/93. See Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R.
at 1-3981, 6, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 292 (quoting question that Supreme Court of Ireland referred to ECJ for preliminary ruling). Advocate General Jacobs issued an opin-
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more narrow and concrete interpretation of Regulation 990/93,
affording greater weight to Bosphorus' property rights. This
Comment concludes that the ECJ should adopt a more narrow
and concrete interpretation of Regulation 990/93 and should
refrain from following its holding that Regulation 990/93 did
not apply to Bosphorus's aircraft, thereby further strengthening
and clarifying the European Community's commitment to the
protection of property rights.
I. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S STRUCTURE, SOURCES OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL
REACTIONS TO THE WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA
The general principles of Community law ensure the observance of fundamental rights.36 The right to property3 7 is among
the fundamental rights that the EC legal order, including the
ECJ, protects. 3 8 The war taking place in Yugoslavia in the early

1990s occasioned response from various international organizations,9 including the United Nations and the European Commu3
nity.
A. Structure of the European Community
The European Community is a product of the 1957 Treaty
ion on the referred question to the

ECJ. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bospho-

rus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret v. Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications, Ireland and the Attorney General, Case C-84/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-3956, 1-3977,
70, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 272, 291.
36. Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, 506, 1 13, [1974] 2
C.M.L.RL 338, 354.
37. Fiona Campbell-White, Property Rights: A ForgottenIssue Under the Union, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND HuMAN RIGHTS 249, 251-59 (Nanette A. Neuwahl & Allan Rosas
eds., 1995). Intellectual property, exclusive rights of undertakings, timeshares, and real
property are among the types of property that the ECJ has protected in its case law. Id.
The EC Treaty states, "[tihis Treaty shall in no way prejudice rules in Member States
governing the system of property ownership." EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 222, [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. at 711. The ECJ has minimized the impact of Article 222, however, by subordinating property rights to other EC Treaty objectives. See Campbell-White, supra, at
249, 251-60 (arguing, in general, that ECJ has given less priority to property rights than
to other EC Treaty objectives, and arguing that ECJ protection of exclusive rights
granted to undertakings, intellectual property, and timeshares has been insufficient).
38. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3744, 1 17, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64.
39. See Bohr, supra note 5, at 260-62 (recounting NATO, U.N., and EC reactions in
1991 and 1992 to war in Yugoslavia).
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Establishing the European Economic Community4 ° ("EEC
Treaty").41 The various amendments that the Single European
Act4 2 ("SEA") and the Treaty on European Union 4" ("TEU")
made to the EEC Treaty have determined the form in which the
European Community exists today." The European Community
contains five institutions, which are the Council of Ministers 5
(the "Council"), the Commission,4 6 the ECJ, 47 the European Parliament4 8 ("Parliament"), and the Court of Auditors.4 9
1. Treaties
The EEC Treaty, which Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed in Rome on March
25, 1957,50 established a Community with legal personality. 5
The SEA, which became effective on July 1, 1987, added to and
modified the EEC Treaty.5 2 In addition, the TEU, whose amendments the 1995 Treaty Establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty") incorporate,53 modified the EEC Treaty.5 4 The
EC Treaty lists the promotion in the European Community of
economic balance and harmony, non-inflationary growth that respects the environment, high levels of employment, increased
40. EEC Treaty, supra note 9. The EEC Treaty also bears the name Treaty of
Rome. MATHTJSEN, supra note 9, at 4.
41. See MATHUSEN, supra note 9, at 4 (outlining evolution from European Eco-

nomic Community to current European Community).
42. SEA, supra note 9.
43. TEU, supra note 9.
44. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 14-19 (1993) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW] (discussing changes that
SEA and TEU made to EEC Treaty).
45. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 145-54, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-82 (setting
forth functions and composition of Council).
46. See id., arts. 155-63, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682-84 (stating duties and composition of Commission).
47. See id., arts. 164-88, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684-91 (setting forth duties, composition, and procedures of ECJ).
48. See id., arts. 137-44, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676-79 (describing duties, role, and
composition of Parliament).
49. See id., arts. 188a-88c, [1992] 1 C.M.LR. at 691-93 (describing function and
composition of Court of Auditors).
50. Goebel, supra note 9, at 1094.
51. DAVID A.O. EDWARD & ROBERT C. LANE, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 4 (1991).
52. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 44, at 15.
53. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., 1995 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON EuROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 2 (1995) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT TO EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY

LAW].
54. MATHIJSEN, supra note 9, at 4.
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standards of living and quality of life, and economic and social

cooperation and unity among the EC Member States as among
the Community's tasks." The EC Treaty demands that the European Community achieve the tasks that it lists by creating a com57
mon marke 5 6 and an economic and monetary union.
2. European Community Institutions

The Council, the Commission, the ECJ, the Parliament, and
the Court of Auditors are the five EC institutions. 5 The Council
functions as a legislative body.59 The Commission, which

presents drafts of EC legislation to the Council, is the Community's policy engine.6" The ECJ functions as the EC chiefjudicial
body,6" ensuring that EC institutions and Member States observe
the law in their interpretation and application of the EC
55. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588.
56. Id. The common market "seeks to promote the free exchange of goods, services and capital between the Member States in the material interests of their inhabitants." DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 13

(1987). The European Community achieves the common market in various economic
fields in part by abolishing customs duties and quantitative restrictions on trade, phasing in a common external tariff, and prohibiting state monopolies commercial in nature, government subsidies, and agreements that restrain trade. Id. at 21.
57. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588. The economic union
that the EC Treaty mandates involves the "coordination of the economic policies of the
Member States." MATHIJSEN, supra note 9, at 299. The attainment of a monetary union
will involve:
[T] he irrevocable fixing of exchange rates leading to the introduction of a
single currency, the ECU, and the definition and conduct of a single monetary
policy and exchange rate policy the primary objective of both of which shall be
to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to support
the general economic policies in the Community, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.
EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3a, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 589.
58. MATHUSEN, supra note 9, at 23.
59. EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY LAw, supra note 44, at 51.
60. A. LEwis, EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY LAW 17 (1992).

61. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 44, at 50. The European Community's
other legal body is the Court of First Instance upon which the Council has conferred
jurisdiction to hear "all direct actions brought by natural or legal persons, whether for
annulment or damages." SUPPLEMENT TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 53, at
25. The Court of First Instance also has the authority to hear all anti-dumping and antisubsidy cases. Id. The motivation behind the creation of the Court of First Instance was
to relieve the EJ of the burdens and delays resulting from the ECJ's large caseload.
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 44, at 72. The Court of First Instance is attached
to the EC, and a party can appeal the Court of First Instance's decision concerning a
point of law to the ECJ. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 168a(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 68586.
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Treaty. 62 The Parliament participates in the legislative process

and has powers over the Community's budget.63 The Court of
Auditors acts as the Community's accountant, determining

whether the management of the Community's finances is
sound. 64
a. The Council
The Council serves as one of the EC legislative bodies.6 5

The Council's function is to make sure that the European Community attains the objectives that the EC Treaty sets forth.66 The
Council's members are representatives of Member State governments who vote as their States instruct them.67 The Member
States' representation in the Council and, thus, their voting
power, is weighted according to the Member States' relative
populations. 68 The Council is not a permanent body and, therefore, the Committee of Permanent Representatives 69 does much
of the Council's work. ° The Council acts by a majority of its
members, unless the EC Treaty provides otherwise. 7 ' In certain
areas, EC Treaty provisions provide for either unanimity voting
or qualified majority voting, which requires sixty-two out of
72
eighty-seven votes to pass an act.
b. The Commission
The Commission is the Community's executive body.73 The
Commission consists of twenty members, among whom there
must be at least one member, but no more than two, from each
62. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 164, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684.
63. MATHIJSEN, supra note 9, at 28.
64. EDWARD & LANE, supra note 51, at 28.
65. EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY LAW, supra note 44, at 51. The Council "exercises primary legislative power within the Community." Id.
66. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 145, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679.
67. MATHiJSEN, supra note 9, at 50.
68. EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY LAW, supra note 44, at 51.
69. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 151(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 681. The EC Treaty
provides, "[a] committee consisting of the Permanent Representatives of the Member
States shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council and for carrying out
the tasks assigned to it by the Council." Id.
70. LEwis, supra note 60, at 13.
71. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 148(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 680.
72. Id. art. 148(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 680.
73. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 44, at 57.
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Member State. 74 The design of a legislative program for the European Community, the initiation of the legislative process by
drafting legislation, and the overseeing and enforcing of compliance with Community law are among the Commission's duties. 75
The Commission's authority to initiate legislation is exclusive, so
that the Council cannot consider any legislative measure until
the Commission has proposed the measure. 76 Other Commission tasks include the drafting of the Community's initial annual
budget, which the Council and the Parliament review and may
adopt, and the administering of the Community's finances.77
The Commission also makes decisions, 7 in which it gives rulings
on issues concerning such topics as competition law and state
aid.7 9
c. The ECJ
The ECJ's function is to ensure that the actions of EC Member States and institutions that apply and interpret the EC Treaty
are consistent with rules and principles of law.80 The ECJ's
power to give binding interpretations of Community law is exclusive." In interpreting EC measures, the ECJ gives weight to the
measures' wording 2 while employing a method that is contextual8 s and teleological.8 4 The ECJ, which consists of fifteen
74. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 157(1), [1992] 1 C.M.LR. at 682.
75. EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY LAw, supra note 44, at 57.
76. Id. at 51.
77. Id. at 59.
78. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682. Commission decisions are "taken by a majority of its members and when at least nine members are
present." MATHUSEN, supra note 9, at 74.
79. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 44, at 59.

80. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 164, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684.
81. Carl Otto Lenz, The Role and Mechanism of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 388, 392 (1994).
82. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 56, at 91.

83. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3983,

11, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293. "As the

Court has stated in its caselaw, in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider its wording, its context and its aims." Id. A contextual method of

interpretation takes into account "the place of the provision within the scheme of the
instrument to which it belongs, and of that instrument in the Community order." WYATT & DAS-WOOD, supra note 56, at 91-92.
84. WYATt & DASHWOOD, supra note 56, at 92; EUROPEAN COMMUNrry LAw, supra
note 44, at 144. The teleological method involves interpreting a text by focusing on the
purpose that the Community attempted to achieve by passing the measure. Id.; WYATr

& DAS-wOOD, supra note 56, at 92; see Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, Case 29/
69, [1969] E.C.R. 419, 424, 3, [1970] C.M.L.R 112, 118 (propounding method of
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judges,8 5 carries out its duties under the EC Treaty by hearing
original actions 6 against EC institutions8 7 and Member States.8 8
In addition, the ECJ has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
on the interpretation and legitimacy of Community acts.8 9 Advocates General help the ECJ perform its functions by providing

reasoned submissions on ECJ cases.90 One of the principles the

ECJ invokes in its decisions is the principle of proportionality, 9'
according to which governmental measures must not establish
restrictions that extend beyond what is appropriate and neces92
sary to achieve the restriction's purpose.
i. Preliminary Rulings
Article 177 of the EC Treaty authorizes the ECJ to render
preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the EC Treaty, the
validity and interpretation of EC institutions' actions, and the
interpretation of the laws of bodies that Council acts bring into
being.9" Only a Member State court or tribunal may request a
preliminary ruling.9 4 A Member State court or tribunal of last
resort must refer a question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling if
interpretation based on intentions of measure's author and aim author sought to
achieve). The ECJ occasionally emphasizes a provision's ambiguity, especially as it results from a divergence among the various linguistic versions of the measure, in justifTing its use of the teleological method. Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretationat the Court of
Justice, 20 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 657, 661-63 (1997). In order to ascertain the EC purposes
in passing a particular measure, the ECJ relies on the EC Treaty, declarations by EC
Member States or institutions, the measure's legislative history, and even, occasionally,
"legislative texts not in force at the time [but] material to the case" and EC Commission
legislative proposals that the European Community has not yet adopted. Id. at 673-80.
85. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 165, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684.
86. EUROPEAN COMMUNITy LAw, supra note 44, at 69.
87. EC Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 173, 175, 178, 184, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687-90.
88. Id., arts. 169, 170, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686-87.
89. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 44, at 69.
90. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 166, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685. The EC Treaty
states, "[t]heJudges [of the ECJ] and Advocates General shall be chosen from persons
whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for
appointment to the highestjudicial offices in their respective countries or who arejurisconsults of recognised competence." Id., art. 167, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685.
91. WYATr & DAsHWOOD, supra note 56, at 60.
92. KENT, supra note 10, at 56.
93. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689. The Court of First
Instance is among the bodies that the Council has established. EUROPEAN COMMUNrY
LAw, supra note 44, at 72. The EC Treaty explicitly deprives the Court of First Instance
ofjurisdiction to hear requests for a preliminary ruling under Article 177. EC Treaty,

supra note 9, art. 168a(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685-86.
94. MATHUSEN, supra note 9, at 99.
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the court or tribunal believes that it needs a ruling on a question
in order to render judgment. 95 Any other Member State court
or tribunal may, however, exercise its discretion in determining
96
whether to refer a question for a preliminary ruling.
A Member State court or tribunal can make a reference to
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling either by judgment or by order.17 An ECJ judgment on a reference for a preliminary ruling
is binding on the court or tribunal that referred the question
and on any other court that rules on the same issue in the future. 98 In addition, the ECJ's judgment functions as precedent
that the ECJ will abide by in future similar matters.99
ii. The Role of the Advocate General
The Advocate General's duty is to present in open court reasoned submissions on ECJ cases to assist the ECJ in the performance of the ECJ's duties under the EC Treaty. 100 Advocates General must analyze the case in an impartial and independent manner. 01' In their submissions, Advocates General present their
personal opinions on the case and can examine questions re02
lated to the case, even those that the parties have not raised.1
After the Advocate General, whom the First Advocate General
assigned to a case, has delivered his or her Opinion, he or she
has no role in the case.'0 3 ECJjudges do not have, however, an
obligation either to follow the Advocate General's Opinion or to
let it influence their decisions.104
95. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689. A Member State
court or tribunal of last resort need not refer a question to the ECJ for a preliminary
ruling if the court or tribunal has concluded that "the question raised is irrelevant or
that the Community provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or
that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for
reasonable doubt." Srl C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Minister of Health, Case 283/81, [1982] E.C.R.
3415, 3431,
21, [1983) 1 C.M.L.R. 472. 491.
96. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689.
97. Lenz, supra note 81, at 399.
98. Id. at 403.
99. Id.
100. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 166, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685.
101. Id. Advocates General's submissions "are objective and do not represent the
views of either party." KENT, supra note 10, at 18.
102. MATHUSEN, supra note 9, at 85-86.

103. Lenz, supra note 81, at 402.
104. EUROPEAN COMMUNTY LAW, supra note 44, at 72. "Traditionally, however, the
[Advocate General's] opinion carries great weight in the [ECJ's] deliberations and

1022

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURATAL

[Vol. 20:1007

iii. The Principle of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is a general principle of law
that the ECJ has developed in its case law.105 The ECJ has employed proportionality as a principle of judicial review of EC
acts.10 Proportionality requires that every EC measure hold a
reasonable relationship to the measure's objective. 107 In addition, the measure must be the least burdensome or restrictive of
all the possible means of achieving the objective.' 08 The ECJ has
stated that an EC measure cannot impose on commercial operators charges that are greater than the measure's aim requires. 10 9
The ECJ has also applied the principle of proportionality in
holding that an EC measure may provide for the forfeiture of a
security for failure to perform a contractual obligation only if
the measure makes the forfeiture commensurate with the degree
often the [ECJ] will reach the same conclusion, though perhaps on different grounds."
Id.
105. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 56, at 60. The ECJ "largely derived [the principle of proportionality] from continental principles of constitutional and administrative law... ." George A. Bermann, Taking SubsidiaritySeriously: Federalismin the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 386 (1994). Germany is one of
the states from whose constitutional jurisprudence the ECJ has derived the principle of
proportionality. KENT, supra note 10, at 56. In German law, proportionality has the
status of a right underlying the German Constitution. Id. The TEU has explicitly
adopted the principle of proportionality, stating that "[a] ny action by the Community
shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty." TEU,
supra note 9, art. 3(b), O.J. C 224/1, at 8 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590.
106. See Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3747, 23, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 66 (applying
principle of proportionality in case concerning EC regulation restricting planting of
vines); Bermann, supra note 105, at 387.
107. Id. at 386. The concept of proportionality requires that there be a reasonable
relationship between the measure's means and its ends. T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY LAw 155 (1994). The reasonable relationship requirement "implies both that the means must be reasonably likely to bring about the objective, and that the detriment to those adversely affected must not be disproportionate to
the benefit of the public." Id.
108. Bermann, supra note 105, at 386; see Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH
v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R.
1125, 1136, 16, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255, 285 (comparing burden of licensing requirement with measure's objective). In finding valid a Council regulation conditioning the
issue of export and import licenses upon the payment of a deposit, the ECJ stated,
"[the costs involved in the deposit do not constitute an amount disproportionate to
the total value of the goods in question and of the other trading costs," and "the burdens resulting from the system of deposits are not excessive and are the normal consequence of a system of organization of the markets conceived to meet the requirements
of the general interest... ." Id.
109. Balkan-Import-Export GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof, Case 5/73,
[1973] E.C.R. 1091, 1111-112, 22.
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of the failure or with the seriousness of the breach. 1 10
d. The European Parliament and the Court of Auditors
The European Parliament ("Parliament") consists of representatives of the peoples of the EC Member States."' The people of Member States directly elect Members of Parliament,
whose duty is to represent the people rather than a Member
State government. 12 In most areas of Community law, the
Council must consult with the Parliament before passing legislation." 3 In addition to the consultation procedure," 4 the cooperation procedure provides that the Council needs a unanimous
vote to override the Parliament's rejection of proposed legislation, "1 5 and the co-decision procedure provides that an absolute
majority of Parliament can reject a measure that the Council has
approved." 6 The EC Treaty grants Parliament the right to
amend the draft budget, propose modifications of the budget to
the Council, and, if it has important reasons for doing so, to reject the budget after the Council has considered its amendments
17
and proposed modifications.
The Court of Auditors assists the Parliament and the Council in the exercise of their controls over the budget."' The
Court of Auditors' duty involves the examination of the accounts
of all of the EC revenue and expenditures in order to ensure
that management has been sound. 1 9 The members of the
Court of Auditors must perform their duties in an independent
20
manner, seeking and taking instructions from no government.1
110. Atalanta Amsterdam B.V. v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, Case 240/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 2137, 2150-51, 15.
111. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 137, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676.
112. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 44, at 65.
113. Id. at 80. Exceptions to the rule that legislation requires the consultation of
Parliament include "directives on the free movement of capital with third states [EC
Treaty art. 73c]" and most measures to be taken... in creating the [European Monetary Union]." Id.
114. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 189a, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694; see MATHUSEN,
supra note 9, at 29-31 (discussing consultation procedure).
115. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 189c, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 696-97; see EUROPEAN
COMMUNrry LAw, supra note 44, at 84-85 (describing cooperation procedure).

116. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 189b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694-95; see EUROPEAN
LAw, supra note 44, at 89-90 (describing co-decision procedure).
117. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 203(4), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 703.
118. Id., art. 188c(4), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693.
119. Id., art. 188c(1)-(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 692.
120. Id., art. 188b(4), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 691-92.

COMMUNITY

1024

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 20:1007

B. Sources of FundamentalRights in the European Community
The general principles of Community law include respect
for fundamental rights.12 1 The ECJ has applied the European
Human Rights Convention's human rights provisions in its case
law. 2 2 Article F(2) of the TEU requires the European Union to
respect fundamental rights that the European Human Rights
Convention guarantees or that originate in the Member States'
common constitutional traditions. 12 3 The class of fundamental
rights principles that the ECJ will apply in its case law is not limited, however,1 2 1 which leaves room for the ECJ to apply theories
2
including those of natural law philosophy.1 1. The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Members of the Council of Europe12 6 originally signed the
European Human Rights Convention in 1950, and other nations
121. Nold, [1974] E.C.R. at 506, 1 13, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 354; Manfred A.
Dauses, The Protectionof FundamentalRights in the Community Legal Order, 10 EUR. L. RE,.

398, 400 (1985); Henry G. Schermers, The European Communities Bound by Fundamental
Rights, 27 COMMON MKcr. L. REv. 249, 249 (1990). Some of the fundamental rights that
the ECJ recognizes are the freedom of expression, the freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs, the inviolability of the home, the right to property, and the right not to
be discriminated against on grounds of gender. See Krogsgaard, supra note 21, at 100,
n.4 (listing fundamental rights that Eq has asserted).
122. See Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3745-46, 11 17-19, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64-65 (discussing and invoking European Human Rights Convention's property rights provision
in holding that EC regulation limiting planting of vines did not effect property rights
violation) see Krogsgaard, supra note 21, at 107-08 (discussing role which European
Human Rights Convention has played in ECJ's case law on fundamental rights).
123. TEU, supra note 9, art. F(2), O.J. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
728. Article F(2) provides, "[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ... and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, as general principles of Community law." Id.
124. See WYATr & DAs-IwooD, supra note 56, at 70-71 (stating that categories of
principles ECJ will apply are seemingly not closed and discussing cases where EJ has
introduced new principles into its jurisprudence).
125. See Orro GIERKE, NATURAL LAw AND THE THEORY OF SociETY 95-114 (Ernest

Barker trans., 1960) (discussing natural law philosophy's conception of relationship between individuals and society).
126. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 44, at 3. The Council of Europe is an

intergovernmental organization of 26 European states lead by a Committee of Ministers
and by national parliamentary representatives who sit as a Consultative Assembly that
has produced, among other international agreements, the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Id. at 3-4. The Council
of Europe "has helped sustain the idea of a common European identity." Id. at 4.

1997]

THE BOSPHORUS CASE

1025

later acceded to it. 1 2 7 The Convention requires its signatories to
secure a number of rights and freedoms, among which are the
right not to be subjected to torture, 128 the right not to be held in
slavery, 129 the right to liberty and security of person,13 0 the right
to respect for one's private life and home,' 3 ' the right to freedom of thought and religion,13 2 and the right to freedom of expression. 3 The European Community is not a signatory to the
Convention. 3 4

The European Human Rights Convention provides for the
creation of a European Court of Human Rights3 5 ("CHR") and
a European Commission of Human Rights3 6 ("Human Rights
Commission"), to ensure that signatories abide by the provisions
of the Convention. 3 7 The CHR's function is to ensure that the
signatories to the Convention observe the provisions to which
they agreed.13 8 The CHR carries out this function by interpret127. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw: SELECTED Docu204 n.1 (1993) (hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SELECTED DOCUMENTS). The
original signatories to the European Human Rights Convention were Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the Saar, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
Id. Austria (1958), Cyprus (1962), Malta (1967), Switzerland (1974), Portugal (1978),
Spain (1979), Liechtenstein (1982), and San Marino (1989) subsequently acceded to
the Convention. Id.
128. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 25, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at
224.
129. Id., art. 4, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
130. Id., art. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. at 226.
131. Id., art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
132. Id., art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
133. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 25, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. at
230.
MENTs

134. EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY LAw, supra note 44, at 146.

135. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 25, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. at
234. The CHR consists of a number ofjudges equal to the number of Member States of
the Council of Europe. MERRILLS, supra note 33, at 6. The CHR issues decisions on
issues concerning CHRjurisdiction and the interpretation and application of the Convention's substantive provisions. Id. at 8-9.
136. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 25, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. at
234. The number of members of the Human Rights Commission is equal to the
number of parties to the Convention. TOM ZwART, THE ADMISSIBILrY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS PETITIONS 23 (1994). The Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers elects

Human Rights Commission members who serve for a six-year period. Id.
137. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 25, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. at
234.
138. P. VAN DJK & GJ.H. vAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CON.

VENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 20 (2nd ed. 1990).
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ing and applying the Convention's substantive provisions.' 3 9
The CHR's decisions are binding on the parties to the Convention. 140 A state that the CHR has found in violation of the Convention must take steps, including the enactment of legislation,
to cure the state's human rights deficiency. 4
The Human Rights Commission's task is to determine the
admissibility of applications to the CHR and to attempt to arrive
at a settlement of the parties' dispute. 42 In addition, in its report declaring an application admissible, the Human Rights
Commission identifies the case's subject-matter and issues for
purposes of applying the Convention.'
Furthermore, the
Human Rights Commission has the responsibility of establishing
the case's facts.

144

In its decision, the CHR does not have to follow the conclusions of the Human Rights Commission.' 45 Even if the CHR and
the Human Rights Commission reach the same conclusion, they
may apply different reasoning.
When the CHR has decided
an issue, the Human Rights Commission will adopt the CHR's
approach in future similar cases.' 47 The Human Rights Commission, which hears more cases than the CHR, will often develop
its own reasoning and opinions on an issue, with the CHR applying that reasoning upon its first opportunity to decide that is14 8
sue.
The European Human Rights Convention functions as a
source of fundamental rights in the European Community. 49
The ECJ has applied in its case law principles that the Conven139. MERRIUtS, supra note 33, at 9.

140. vAN DUK & vAN HOOF, supra note 138, at 133.
141. MERRILLS, supra note 33, at 12.
142. vAN DUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 138, at 61. The Human Rights Commission
may reject any petition if the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies, and the
Human Rights Commission may reject petitions from applicants other than states if
they are anonymous or blatantly lack a foundation for their claims, and on various
other grounds. MERRILLS, supra note 33, at 2.

143.

MERRILLS,

supra note 33, at 3-4.

144. A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HuMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 274 (3rd ed.

1993).
145. MERRILLS, supra note 33, at 15.

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3743-44, 1 15, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64.
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tion's provisions articulate. 150 In addition, the TEU demands
that the European Union respect fundamental rights that the
European Human Rights Convention protects. 15 1
2. Constitutional Traditions Common to Member States
In Stauder v. City of UlMr, 5 2 the ECJ stated that the general
principles of Community law contain fundamental rights and
that the ECJ protects these rights.'5 One year later, the ECJ expanded this principle in Intenationale Handelsgesellschaft v.
Einfuhr 54 ("IHG"), asserting that the constitutional traditions
common to the EC Member States inspire the protection of fundamental rights in the European Community. 155 In 1992, the
TEU codified IHG's statement in Article F(2), which mandates
that the European Union respect fundamental rights resulting
from the Member States' common constitutional traditions. 5 6
Article F(2) does not specify how the ECJ is to derive these
fundamental rights from Member State traditions. 5 7 The ECJ
has stated that measures inconsistent with the fundamental
rights that Member State constitutions recognize are unacceptable in the European Community.5 8 Neither this ECJ proposition nor TEU Article F(2) indicates, however, whether the ECJ
must respect all the rights that the Member States constitutions
protect.1 59 One way of reformulating this question is to ask
whether the ECJ must give the protection provided by the Member State constitution providing the greatest amount of protec150. See id. at 3744-45, 11 17-19, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64-65 (discussing Article 1 of
Protocol I to Convention in context of property rights issue).
151. TEU, supra note 9, art. F(2), O.J. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
728. Article F(2) provides, "[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms... as general principles of common law." Id.
152. Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419,
(1970] C.M.L.R. 112.
153. Id. at 425, 1 7, [1970] C.M.L.R. at 119.
154. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, (1970] E.C.R. 1125, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255.
155. Id. at 1133, 4, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 283.
156. TEU, supra note 9, art. F(2), O.J. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
728. Article F(2) provides, " [t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as they result
from the constitutional traditions common to Member States, as general principles of
common law." Id.
157. Krogsgaard, supra note 21, at 107.
158. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3744, 1 15, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64.
159. Krogsgaard, supra note 21, at 105.
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tion in the case at hand.161° The ECJ has, however, rejected such

16
a maximalist approach.

3. Treaties
Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union commands

the European Union to respect fundamental rights by making
reference to the European Human Rights Convention and the
constitutional traditions of Member States.'6 2 Article F(2), however, is not one of the TEU's articles that fall within the ECJ's
because the provisions of the ECSC, 16 4
jurisdiction 6 '
160. Id.
161. See Hoechst AG v. Commission, Case 227/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2859, 2924, 18,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 410, 481 (holding that, although some Member State constitutions
extended right of inviolability of home to both natural and legal persons, this principle
was not acceptable in Community law, which extended right only to natural persons);
Krogsgaard, supra note 21, at 106;Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental
Human Rights within the Legal Order of the European Communities, 61 WAsH. L. REv. 1108,
1128 (1986). The ECJ itself has now without a doubt rejected the maximalist approach.
Krogsgaard, supra note 21, at 106. In arguing that the Eq has rejected the maximalist
approach, one scholar states that the ECJ's adoption of the maximal standard prevailing among the Member States would effectively subject the European Community to
the different Member States' constitutional dictates and, thus, is an impossible policy.
Weiler, supra, at 1128. The ECJ does not concern itself with investigating what precise
answer a particular national court or transnational tribunal would give to a question.
Id. at 1132. Rather, the ECJ simply wants to establish the overall principles and the
direction that constitutional review will take in Member States. Id. The Eq would be
content in the case of conflicting constitutional traditions to adopt the one most suited,
in its view, to the EC situation. Id. The fundamental rights that the Member States'
constitutions recognize are only principles, general rules and guidance for the ECJ. Id.
at 1133. But see Dauses, supra note 121, at 408 (arguing that ECJ has mainly applied
maximalist approach).
162. TEU, supra note 9, art F(2), O.J. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
728. Article F(2) provides, "[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ... and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, as general principles of common law." Id. Whereas the ECJ applies the
Member States' constitutional provisions according to its discretion, the drafters of the
TEU seem to have intended to bind the ECJ to the standards of the European Human
Rights Convention. Krogsgaard, supra note 21, at 108. The reference in Article F(2) of
the TEU to the European Human Rights Convention is a codification of the ECJ's application of the Convention as a source of fundamental rights, and in the future the
European Community will have a legal obligation to observe the standards of the Convention. Id.
163. TEU, supra note 9, art L, O.J. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 738
(stating that ECJ's powers which EC Treaty, ECSC Treaty, and Euratom Treaty granted
it shall apply to specified TEU provisions and articles, of which Article F(2) is not one);
see also Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3971-72, 52,
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Euratom, 6 5 and EEC Treaty166 that concern the ECJ do not apply to Article F(2) of the TEU. 167 Although the EC Treaty16

lacks express reference to fundamental rights,169 some of the
goals the EC Treaty lists suggest a need for a commitment by the
European Community to human rights in order to achieve those

goals.

70

4. Natural Law
The ECJ's jurisprudence allows for the possibility of an expansion of the ECJ's catalogue of general principles.' 7' Concerning property rights, one such possibility is the Lockean theory of natural law. 172 John Locke 173 argued that God gave
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 286 (explaining why ECJ does not have jurisdiction over TEU
Article F(2)).
164. ECSC Treaty, supra note 22.
165. Euratom Treaty, supra note 22.
166. EEC Treaty, supra note 9.
167. TEU, supra note 9, art. L, O.J. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
738. TEU Article L states:
The provisions of the [EC Treaty], the [ECSC Treaty] and the [Euratom
Treaty] concerning the powers of the [ECJ] and the exercise of those powers
shall apply only to the following provisions of this Treaty: (a) provisions
amending the [EEC Treaty], the [ECSC Treaty] and the [Euratom Treaty];
(b) third subparagraph of Article K3(2)(c); (c) Articles L to S.
Id.
168. EC Treaty, supra note 9.
169. See Krogsgaard, supra note 21, at 100 (noting failure of three founding treaties, including EEC Treaty, to mention fundamental rights).
170. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588 (stating that EC
goals are promotion in European Community of "harmonious and balanced development of economic activities ....
high level of employment and social protection, the
raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion
and solidarity among Member States."). Other EC Treaty provisions that suggest a need
for a human rights jurisprudence are those calling for the strengthening of competitiveness of EC industry, the promotion of research and technological development, and a
contribution to the attainment of a high level of health protection. See id., art. 3(m-o),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 589 (listing EC activities).
171. See WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 56, at 70-71 (stating that categories of
principles ECJ will apply are seemingly not closed and discussing cases where ECJ has
introduced new principles into its jurisprudence).
172. SeeJOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GovERNMENT 18-30 (C.B. Macpherson
ed. 1980) (basing conception of right to property on natural law theory of human relationship to God and Earth).
173. 5 FREDERUCK COPPLESTON, S.J., A HISTORY OF PILOSOPHY 67-69. (1959). John
Locke was a British empiricist philosopher who wrote several influential works on political philosophy and the philosophy of knowledge in the 17th century. Id.
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174
humans the world and, along with it, the right to property.
For Locke, this right has its basis in the law of natural reason,
according to which humans have a right to preserve themselves. 175 Locke argued, however, that in order for a property
1 76
right to vest, one must labor on that which one wants to own.

For Locke, the right to property derives from a natural law
177
that governs humans independently of states and state laws.
Locke's conception of the right to property exemplifies the natural law principle that the individual's rights have inherent priority over those of society. 178 Natural law theory, thus, would
support the idea that society must give adequate justification for
the confiscation of property, rather than individuals having to
justify keeping property that they already own. 79
C. Sources Of Property Rights In The European Community
The ECJ is committed to the protection of the right to property."' The ECJ has developed its property rights jurisprudence
by making use of property rights principles resulting from the
European Human Rights Convention. 18 1 In addition, the ECJ
ensures property rights in its case law by drawing inspiration
82
from the constitutional traditions of the EU Member States.
174. See LOcKE, supra note 172, at 18-19 (setting forth foundations of philosophy of
property).
175. See id. at 18 (discussing human right to preservation as preface to discussion
of property).
176. Id. at 19.
177. COPPLESTON, supra note 173, at 129; see LOCKE, supra note 172, at 71 (stating
that human-made laws merely add penalties to natural law that precedes civil society).
178. See GIERKE, supra note 125 (discussing natural law theory's principle that individuals are prior to communities); see also LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW ANDJUSTICE
80-81 1987 (discussing Locke's theory that individuals' natural rights and obligations
precede civil society and remain in force after one has left state of nature); LocKE, supra
note 172, at 65-67 (explaining that one of reasons humans entered into civil society was
to preserve their possessions and that governments' right to exist is based in humans'
voluntary surrender of their right in state of nature to punish thieves as they wish).
179. Id. at 103; see Locke, supra note 172, at 73 (theorizing that government has no
right to take away people's property without their consent because humans entered
into society in order to preserve their property).
180. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3744,
17, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64.
181. See id. at 3744-45,
17-19, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64-65 (quoting and analyzing
Article 1 of Protocol I to the European Human Rights Convention); see also Krogsgaard,
supra note 21, at 100-02 (noting ECJ's reference to European Human Rights Convention and Member States' constitutional traditions as sources of fundamental rights).
182. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3744, 1 17, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64.
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1. Property Rights as Defined by the European Human Rights
Convention
Article 1 of the first Protocol ("Protocol I") to the European
Human Rights Convention asserts all humans' entitlement to
the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.'
Article 1 of Protocol I prohibits governments from depriving individuals of their
possessions except when deprivation would advance the public
interest.18 4 In addition, Article I of Protocol I permits states to
control the use of property as society's general interest dictates.18 5 The CHR has applied the provisions of186
Article 1 of Protocol I to cases involving property rights issues.
a. Article One of Protocol I to the European Human Rights
Convention and the Right of Property
In 1952, all of the original signatories to the European
Human Rights Convention18 7 signed Protocol I to the Convention."' Article 5 of Protocol I states that the Protocol's provisions constitute additional provisions of the Convention.189 Article 1 of Protocol I asserts the rights of persons to the peaceful
enjoyment of their possessions. 9 ° Article 1 also limits deprivation of possessions to that which the public interest necessitates
and to the conditions that national laws and principles of international law specifyr. 91 Further, Article 1 authorizes a state to
183. Protocol to Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Protocol I].
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Sporrong v. Sweden, 5 E.H.R.R. 35, 50-55, 11 60-74 (1983) (invoking
property rights provisions of Article 1 of Protocol I in holding that City of Stockholm's
expropriation permits and prohibitions on construction had violated property owners'
right to property).
187. EUROPEAN COMMUNTY SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 127, at 209 n.2.
188. Protocol I, supra note 183, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 262.
189. Id., art. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. at 264.
190. Id., art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 262. The CHR has interpreted the concept of
possessions broadly, and "possessions" do not have to be concrete items of property for
the CHR to protect the peaceful enjoyment of them. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra
note 144, at 213. In addition, the Human Rights Commission has interpreted "possessions" as covering any property right or interest that the domestic law of Convention
signatories recognizes. J.E.S. FAWCETr, APPUCATION OF THE EUROPEAN .CONVENTIONON
HUMAN RIGHTS 407 (2nd ed. 1987).
191. Protocol I, supra note 183, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 262. Specifically, Protocol
I's first paragraph states, "[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the
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restrict uses of property by law in ways consistent with general
societal interests. 19 2 The ECJ has interpreted Article 1 as accepting the legitimacy of limitations on the use of private property, but requiring such limitations to extend only so far as a
state considers necessary for the protection of the general socie-

tal interest.19
b. The European Community and the European Court of
Human Rights
The ECJ has applied the Convention's human rights provisions in its case law addressing the right to property.19 4 The
Convention functions as a source of guidance for the ECJ., 95
The question of whether the ECJ will interpret the Convention
or will apply the Human Rights Commission and CHR's interpretations could create a jurisdictional conflict between the European Community and the Convention's respective systems of
law.' 96 The ECJ has responded to this dilemma by following the
Human Rights Commission and the CHR's interpretations of
the Convention. 9 7 In Sporrong v. Sweden, 198 the CHR and the
public interest and subject to conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law." Id. The deprivation of possessions in the public interest
under Article 1 of Protocol I includes taxation, customs duties, the imposition of fines,
orders for attachment of unlawful property, the redistribution of land in clearance
projects, and compulsory contributions to social security programs. FAwcE-r, supra
note 190, at 407-08.
192. Protocol I, supra note 183, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 262. Specifically, Protocol I
provides for "the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control
the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of
taxes or other contributions or penalties." Id.
193. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3745, 19, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 65.
194. See id. at 3745-46, 11 17-19, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64-65 (invoking property
rights provisions of Protocol I to Convention in context of case concerning legality of
Council regulation temporarily prohibiting new planting of vines).
195. Dauses, supra note 121, at 411; see Krogsgaard, supra note 21, at 107 (discussing Convention's role in development of European Community's fundamental rights
jurisprudence). Not only do the Convention's provisions guide the ECJ, but also "there
are strong indications that the Court is now accepting the [Convention] as a direct
source of Community law - that is totally to circumvent the question as to whether the
[Convention's] provisions can be considered part of the Community legal order...."
Id.
196. Krogsgaard, supra note 21, at 109.
197. See Orkem SA v. Commission, [1989] E.C.R 3283, 3350,
30, [1991] 4
C.M.L.R 502, 577 (deferring to CHR decisions in determining correct interpretation of
Article 6 of Convention concerning right not to give evidence against oneself); see aLso
Hoechst, [1989] E.C.R. at 2924, 18, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 418 (noting lack of CHR
case law on Convention article Eq had just interpreted); Krogsgaard, supra note 21, at
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Human Rights Commission addressed issues concerning governmental interference with property rights. 199 In Air Canada v.
United Kingdom,2"' the CHR and the Human Rights Commission,
in separate opinions, dealt specifically with a seizure of prop1
erty.

20

i. Sporrong v. Sweden
The Sporrong case concerned the effects of expropriation
permits and prohibitions on construction on the respective
properties of two Stockholm residents. 202 In 1954 and 1968, a
Stockholm city agency prohibited construction on properties respectively owned by applicant Sporrong Estate2 0 3 and applicant
Mrs. I. M. Lonnroth.2 0 4 The Swedish Government had issued to

the Stockholm City Council in 1956 and 1971 zonal expropriation permits, respectively, covering the applicants' properties
that the prohibitions on construction covered. 2 5 The zonal expropriation permits authorized the city to buy land needed to
carry out redevelopment of a heavily populated district for town
planning or public transportation purposes. 0 6 Stockholm obtained from the Government three extensions of the time within
which the city had to begin proceedings for the fixing of compensation to the estate, so that the permit was in effect for a total
of twenty-three years.20 7 As to Mrs. Lonnroth, the Government
granted the city ten years for the institution of a compensation
109 (stating that EJ allows Human Rights Commission and Court of Human Rights to
determine questions concerning interpretation of European Human Rights Convention); Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3973, 11 57-59,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 287-88 (referencing and applying test developed in CHR property
rights cases regarding interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol I). But see Weiler, supra
note 161, at 1126 (stating that Eq insists on interpreting European Human Rights
Convention itself).
198. Sporrong v. Sweden, 5 E.H.R.R. 35 (1983).
199. Id. at 48, 1 53, 56.
200. Air Canada v. United Kingdom, 20 E.H.R.R. 150 (1995).
201. Decision of CHR, Air Canada v. United Kingdom, 20 E.H.R.R. 150, 171, 127;
Opinion of Human Rights Commission, Air Canada v. United Kingdom, 20 E.H.R.R.
150, 1599 127.
202. Sporrong, 5 E.H.R.R. at 37, 9.
203. Id. at 37, 38,
10, 16.
204. Id. at 38, 39, 1 19, 23.
205. Id. at 37, 39, 11 11, 20.
206. Id. at 42, 38.
207. Sporrong, 5 E.H.R.R. at 37-38, 11 11-14.
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2 s

proceeding.
The applicants challenged the expropriation permits and
the construction prohibitions on the grounds that they unjustifiably interfered with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of
their possessions under Article 1.209 The applicants complained
that the expropriation permits and prohibitions on construction
had been in effect for too lengthy a time and rendered impossible the selling of their properties at market prices.2 10 They also
argued that the expropriation permits and prohibitions on construction made the spending of money to improve or change the
properties too risky, especially considering that they would not
have been reimbursed in the event of expropriation for the
properties' resulting capital appreciations.2 11 Finally, they
claimed that the permits and the prohibitions created likely difficulties in obtaining mortgages. 1 2
The CHR held that the expropriation permits violated the
applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions
as Article 1 of Protocol I guaranteed.2 1 3 In so holding, the CHR
noted that the prohibitions on construction, which the City had
imposed in approximate conjunction with the expropriation
permits, had contributed to the expropriation permits' negative
effects. 2 14 After agreeing that the permits and the prohibitions
had interfered with the applicants' property rights by rendering
the rights uncertain and capable of termination, 15 the CHR
considered whether this interference was justified in light of the
provisions of Article 1 of Protocol 1.211 The CHR interpreted
208. Id. at 39, 20.
209. Id. at 48, 1 53.
210. Id. at 49, 58.
211. Id.
212. Sporrong, 5 E.H.R.R. at 49, 58.
213. Id. at 54, 74. The CHR concluded that "[t]he permits in question, whose
consequences were aggravated by the prohibitions on construction, therefore violated
Article 1, as regards both applicants." Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 50, 1 60. The CHR found that the expropriation permits had rendered
the applicants' property right "precarious and defeasible." Id. The CHR argued,
"[a] Ithough the expropriation permits left intact in law the owners' right to use and
dispose of their possessions, they nevertheless in practice significantly reduced the possibility of its exercise." Id. The CHR added that the expropriation permits "also affected the very substance of ownership in that they recognised before the event that any
expropriation would be lawful and authorised the city of Stockholm to expropriate
whenever it found it expedient to do so." Id.
216. Id. at 50-51, 1 61.
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Article 1 as comprising three separate rules.2 17 The first rule sets
forth the right to the peaceful enjoyment of property. 1 The
second rule subjects the deprivation of property to conditions
for which the law and general principles of international law
provide. 219 That the applicants' property was never actually expropriated rendered the second rule irrelevant. 220 The third
rule acknowledges a state's right to enforce laws restricting the
use of property in manners consistent with the general interest. 22 ' The fact that the purpose of the expropriation permits
was not to restrict or control the applicants' use of the property,
22 2
rendered the third rule irrelevant.
In contrast to the second and third rules, the first rule of
Article 1 of Protocol I is general in nature and asserts the right to
the peaceful enjoyment of property.22 3 In examining the first
rule, the CHR stated that whether there had been a violation of
217. Sporrong, 5 E.H.RIR. at 50, 61.
218. Id. at 50-51, 61.
219. Id.; see Protocol I, supra note 183, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 262 (stating, "[e]very
natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.").
220. Sporrong, 5 E.H.R.R. at 51, 63. The CHR noted that, "although the right in
question lost some of its substance, it did not disappear... [and] [t]he effects of the
measures involved are not such that they can be assimilated to a deprivation of possessions." Id.
221. Id. at 50-51, 61. In deciding whether legislation controlling uses of property
has respected the right to property, the CHR and the Human Rights Commission ask
whether the operation of the legislation, and the control thereby exercised, is proportionate to the legitimate aim the state is pursuing through the legislation. DONNA
GOMIEN ET AL., LAW AND PRAcrIcE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RiGHTS
AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 319 (1996). The main criterion for establishing
whether a measure has struck a fair balance in the control of the use of property is the
use that the individual owner intended for the property. Id. The CHR has granted
states much discretion in depriving owners of property in the public interest or controlling property in the general interest. See ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 144, at

214-16 (discussing concepts of public interest and control of property in context of
Article 1 of Protocol I).
222. Sporrong, 5 E.H.R.R. at 51, 65. The CHR observed, "[T]he expropriation
permits were not intended to limit or control [use of the applicants' property]." Id. It
thus concluded that "[s] ince [the expropriation permits] were an initial step in a procedure leading to deprivation of possessions, they did not fall within the ambit of the
[third rule]." Id.
223. Id. at 50-51, 1 61. The term "peaceful enjoyment" of possessions "implies that
Article 1 may . . . have been violate when a person has not been affected as to his
property or possessions per se, but is not accorded an opportunity to use that property."
GOMIEN ET AL., supra note 221, at 319. The Human Rights Commission has not spent
much time interpreting the phrase "peaceful enjoyment," but has said that Article 1
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the applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their property
depended on whether a fair balance between the requirements
of the community's general interest and those of the individual's
fundamental property right had been struck. 24 Despite Stockholm's interest in expropriating properties so as to carry out its
plans, the CHR found that Swedish law should have provided for

the possibility of re-assessing the City's and the owners' respective interests at reasonable intervals during the substantial periods of the permits' maintenance in force. 225 The applicants'
burden would have been justified and, thus, a balance reached
only if the law had allowed them the opportunity to seek compensation or a reduction of the permits' length.2 2 6 Due to the
absence of that opportunity, the permits and prohibitions constituted a violation of their property right under Article 1.227
Eight of the nine dissenting judges issued ajoint dissenting
opinion on the Article 1 issue. 22 8 They stressed the social function of property ownership and the rights of states to regulate
such ownership.2 29 These dissenting judges further argued that
essentially functions in opposition to the arbitrary confiscation of property. FAWCETr,
supra note 190, at 407.
224. Sporrong, 5 E.H.R.R. at 52-53,
69. "For purposes of the [first rule], the
[CHR] must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the
general interest of the Community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights." Id. The CHR also stated, "[t]he search for this balance is
inherent in the whole of the Convention and is also reflected in the structure of Article
1." Id.
225. Id. at 53, 1 70. Earlier in its decision, the CHR had pointed out, "[t] he [relevant Swedish act] did not contain any provisions either on the length of the time-limit
during which the expropriation authority had to institute judicial proceedings for the
fixing of compensation for expropriation, or on the extension of the validity of permits." Id. at 51, 1 67. In concluding that the permits and prohibitions had upset the
requisite fair balance, the CHR stated, "the Sporrong Estate and Mrs. Lonnroth bore an
individual and excessive burden which could have been rendered legitimate only if they
had had the possibility of seeking a reduction of the time-limits or of claiming compensation." Id. at 54, 1 73.
226. Id. at 54,
73. The CHR pointed out that the relevant Swedish law, both
during the periods of the permits and prohibitions' effect and at the time of the CHR
decision, did not allow the applicants to seek compensation or a reduction of the permits' length. Id. The CHR commented that it "does not see why the Swedish legislation
should have excluded the possibility of re-assessing, at reasonable intervals during the
lengthy periods for which each of the permits was granted and maintained in force, the
interests of the city and the interests of the owners." Id. at 53,
70.
227. Id. at 54, 7 73-74.
228. Id. at 59,
1 (dissenting opinion).
229. Sporrong, 5 E.H.R.R. at 60-62, 1 3 (dissenting opinion). The dissenting CHR
judges argued that "modem states are obliged, in the interest of the community, to
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the permits were not in effect for an unreasonable period of
time, given the complex nature of modem urban planning.3 °
Finally, they found that the applicants' retention of ownership
and their rights to dispose of the property and to apply for permission to reconstruct and improve the properties compelled
the conclusion that the City's measures were within the legitimate purposes for which Article
I permitted governments to re21
strict the use of property.
ii. Air Canada v. United Kingdom
In Air Canada v. United Kingdom,32 both the CHR and the
Human Rights Commission held in separate opinions that U.K
customs officials' seizure of an Air Canada233 aircraft did not
constitute a violation of the right to property asserted in Article 1
of Protocol 1.234 Authorities had discovered in the aircraft's
cargo a container holding 331 kilograms of cannabis resin.235
The seizure followed a series of security lapses at London's
Heathrow Airport involving Air Canada, including the smuggling of drugs with the assistance of Air Canada staff.23 6 On the
same day of the seizure, officials returned the
aircraft to the
237
company upon payment of a £50,000 penalty.
In its decision, the CHR applied Sporrong's tri-partite interregulate the use of private property in many respects" and that "[t]here are always social
needs and responsibilities relevant to its ownership and use." Id. at 60, 3.
230. Id. at 61-62, 1 3 (dissenting opinion). "Modern town planning requires, especially in big urban areas, most difficult considerations and evaluations, and its implementation often needs considerable time." Id. At 61,
3 '(dissenting opinion).
231. Id. at 62, 1 3 (dissenting opinion).
232. Air Canada v. United Kingdom, 20 E.H.R.R. 150 (1995).
233. NAWAL K. TANEJA, THE INTERNATIONAL AiRLINE INDUSTRY 15 (1988). Air Canada is Canada's largest airline. Id.
234. Decision of CHR, Air Canada, 20 E.H.R.R. at 176,
48; Opinion of Human
Rights Commission, Air Canada, 20 E.H.R.R. at 163-64, 1 44.
235. Air Canada,20 E.H.R.R. at 154, 7. Cannabis is the scientifically correct term
for marijuana and means "hemp" in Latin. ALBERT GOLDMAN, GRASS ROOTS 33 (1979).
236. Air Canada, 20 E.H.R.R. at 153-54,
6. Customs officials had responded to
each of these incidents with progressively sterner measures, ranging from letters of concern to deductions from Air Canada's bond. Id.
237. Id. at 154, 9. The seizure of the Air Canada's airplane and Air Canada's
payment of the fine both occurred on May 1, 1987. Id. at 154, 11 8-9. On May 1, 1987,
£50,000 equaled approximately US$83,700. See WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 4, 1987, at
31 (showing one British pound to be equal to US$1.674 on May 1, 1987). The impounded aircraft was worth more than £60 million. Air Canada, 20 E.H.R.R. at 154, 1 7.
On May 1, 1987, £60 million equaled approximately US$100,440,000. See WALL ST. J.,
supra, (showing one British pound to be equal to US$1.674 on May 1, 1987).
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pretation2 3 8 of Article 1 of Protocol 1.239 The CHR in Sporrong
had interpreted the second rule of Article I as subjecting the
deprivation of property to conditions that the law and general
principles of international law provide for, and the third rule as
asserting a state's rights to control the use of property in conformity with the public interest.240 In Air Canada, the CHR
stated that the construction of the second and third rules should
be guided by the general right to property that the first rule articulates because the second and third rules concern particular
instances of the right to property.2 41 The CHR concluded that
the third rule applied to the instant case.242 It found that the
seizure amounted to a control, rather than a deprivation, because there was never a transfer of ownership and because the
aircraft had been seized and then released in furtherance of an
243
anti-drug policy.

The CHR then stated that it would be necessary to determine whether the restriction here, the Air Canada seizure, conformed to the third rule set forth in Article 1.11 The CHR
stated that a control would achieve such conformity only if it
struck a fair balance between the community's general interest
and the protections that individuals' fundamental rights required. 45 Such a balance would involve a reasonable relationship of proportionality 46between the restriction and the purpose
behind its enactment.
238. See Sporrong, 5 E.H.R.R. at 50-51, 1 61 (describing each of three rules that
CHR found comprised Article 1 of Protocol I). In Sporrong, the CHR stated that Article
I of Protocol I to the Convention comprised three rules, the first of which set forth the
principle of peaceful enjoyment of property, the second of which covered the deprivation of possessions, and the third of which recognized that states have the right to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. Id.
239. Decision of CHR, Air Canada, 20 E.H.R.R. at 172, 1 29.
240. Sporrong, 5 E.H.R.R. at 50-51, 61.
241. Decision of CHR, Air Canada, 20 E.H.R.R. at 172, 1 30. The Human Rights
Commission also applied Sporrong's interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol I and employed the same rule of construction as the CHR did. Opinion of Human Rights Commission, Air Canada, 20 E.H.R.R. at 160, 1 29.
242. Decision of CHR, Air Canada, 20 E.H.R.R. at 172, 34.
243. Id. at 172, 1 33-34.
244. Id. at 172-73, 35. The Human Rights Commission also concluded that the
third rule applied to the instant case and that it had to determine whether the seizure
was consistent with the third rule. Opinion of Human Rights Commission, Air Canada,
20 E.H.R.R. at 162, 37.
245. Decision of CHR, Air Canada, 20 E.H.R.R. at 173, 1 36.
246. Id. The Human Rights Commission articulated the issue as requiring first a
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The CHR held that there had been no violation of Air Canada's property right protected under Article 1 of Protocol 1,247
finding the £50,000 to be proportionate to the aim of preventing
the importation into the United Kingdom of illegal drugs.2"
The CHR defended its conclusion by referring to Air Canada's
history of security lapses and the U.K. responses to these lapses
and by expressing certainty that the United Kingdom had resorted to seizure in order to compel Air Canada to improve its
security procedures.2 49 In arriving at its conclusion, the CHR
also took into account the large amount and street value of cannabis in the container, as well as the value of the seized aircraft.25 ° Finally, the CHR stated that it kept in mind the state's
margin of discretion in the handling of issues concerning illegal
drugs. 251 Two dissenting CHRjudges argued, however, that the

section of the third rule recognizing states' rights to enforce laws
to secure the payment of penalties should have been applied
here. 52 They based their argument on their belief that the
seizure of an aircraft should not be seen as a control of the use
of cannabis, but rather as a seizure of possessions.253
determination as to the seizure's compatibility with the third rule. Opinion of Human
Rights Commission, Air Canada, 20 E.H.R.R. at 162, 1 37. If the Human Rights Commission found such compatibility, it would have to apply a proportionality test. Id. The
Human Rights Commission phrased this proportionality test as the question "whether
there existed a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed
and the aim sought to be realised." Id.
247. Decision of CHR, Air Canada, 20 E.H.R.R. at 176, 48.
248. Id. at 175-76, 1 47.
249. Id. at 174, 41. The CHR wrote, "the seizure of the applicant's aircraft and
its release subject to payment were undoubtedly exceptional measures which were resorted to in order to bring about an improvement in the company's security procedures." Id.
250. Id. at 175-76, 47.
251. Id. at 176, 1 48. The Human Rights Commission also found that the United
Kingdom had not deprived the airline of its property for any significant time, but rather
had controlled its property in a way consistent with promotion of the public interest
and, thus, in compliance with Article 1 of Protocol I. Opinion of Human Rights Commission, Air Canada,20 E.H.R.R. at 162, 39. The Human Rights Commission decided
the proportionality issue by noting that the third rule allows governments a measure of
discretion, finding that the airline's payment of £50,000 for the aircraft's return was
proportionate to the goal of controlling aircrafts which are used to import drugs. Id. at
163-64, 1 44. The Human Rights Commission justified its own focus on Air Canada's
past security inadequacies by stating that the proportionality determination required
them to examine the entire context of the case. Id. at 163, 1 40.
252. Decision of CHR, Air Canada, 20 E.H.R.R. at 181-82, 1 2.
253. Id.
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2. ECJ Property Rights Case Law
The ECJ has developed a commitment to the protection of the
right to propertyY The ECJ's insistence on the potential for
restriction in favor of EC interests tempers this right's force. 5
In Nold v. Commission, 5 6 the ECJ stated that property rights may
be subject to restrictions that basic EC objectives justify, without
disturbing the substance of the rights. 2 7 The ECJ in Hauer v.
Land Rheinland-Pfalz2 58 expanded upon Nold's property rights
discussion by applying Article 1 of Protocol I, several Member

States' constitutional laws regarding or addressing property
rights, and the principle of proportionality.25 9 In Wachauf v.
State, 6 ° the ECJ applied the analysis used in Hauerto an agricul-

tural leasing case involving the right to compensation for the voluntary abandonment of milk production. 6 1
a. Nold v. Commission

Nold v. Commission involved a claim by Nold, a company engaged in the business of coal-wholesaling, that the new trade
rules a Commission Decision 26 2 ("Decision") authorized violated
Nold's rights to property and to freely pursue a business activity.2 61 The rules authorized a coal-selling agency to require any
entity desiring to be a direct wholesaler of coal to enter into
fixed two-year contracts for the purchase of a minimum amount
of coal for sale to domestic and small consumers.2 6 4 Nold's sales
254. Germany v. Council, Case C-280/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4973, 5065, 1 78; Hauer,
[1979] E.C.R. at 3745, 17, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64; see Nold, [1974] E.C.R. at 507,
14, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 354 (discussing right of ownership in Community law).
255. See Nold, [1974] E.C.R. at 507, 1 14, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 354 (articulating
ECJ's conception of right to property).
256. Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 338.
257. Id. at 508, 1 14, [1974] C.M.L.R. at 354-55.
258. Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, [1980] 3
C.M.LR. 42.
259. Id. at 3745-47, 1 17-23, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64-66.
260. Wachaufv. State, Case 5/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2609, [19911 1 C.M.L.R. 328.
261. See id. at 2634-35, 1 2, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 345 (applying Hauer's discussion
of fundamental rights in European Community to case at hand).
262. Commission Decision No. 21/72, art. 1, OJ. L 120/14, at 16 (1972).
263. Nold, [1974] E.C.R. at 507, 12, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 354.
264. See Commission Decision No. 21/72, supra note 262, par. I(1), O.J. L 120/14,
at 14 (1972) (stating terms of business that coal-selling agency Ruhrkohle AG had submitted for authorization to Commission). Commission Decision 21/72 authorized
Ruhrkohle AG to require the conclusion by coal-wholesalers of."a two-year contract for
a fixed amount of not less than 6,000 metric tons a year of products for the domestic
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in these sectors were well below the contracts' required minimum, and Nold, therefore, claimed that the decision in effect
stripped it of its status as a coal wholesaler. 6 ' Nold argued that
these rules violated its rights to property and to freely pursue a
business activity because, in precluding its acquisition of direct
supplies from producers, the rules endangered the business'
existence by endangering its6 profitability and the unfettered de26
velopment of its business.
The ECJ prefaced its treatment of the issues by noting that
in protecting fundamental rights it must draw inspiration from
constitutional traditions common to EC Member States.2 6 7 In
addition, it observed that international treaties that safeguard
property rights and to which Member States are signatories supply the ECJ with guidelines that it should follow. 268 The ECJ's
analysis stressed the social function of property rights. 269 The

ECJ explained that, just as protection of property rights by the
Member States is always subject to restrictions that the public
interest dictates, those rights in the European Community
should also be subject to limitations based on EC objectives.27 °
The ECJ must not permit these limitations to infringe, however,
upon the substance of the property right affected.271 In response to Nold's argument that the Commission Decision had in
effect taken away its status as a coal wholesaler, the ECJ conand small-consumer sector, on a regional basis" as a condition of being able to buy coal
direct from Ruhrkohle AG for sale to domestic and small consumers. Id.
265. Nold, [1974] E.C.R. at 503, 1, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 351-52.
266. Id. at 507, 12, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 354.
267. Id. at 506, 13, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 354. "In safeguarding [fundamental]
rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to
the Member States... .

Id.

268. Id. The Eq wrote, "[slimilarly, international treaties for the protection of
human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community law." Id.
269. Id. at 508, 14, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 354-55.
270. Nold, [1974] E.C.R. at 508, 14, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 354-55. "If rights of
ownership are protected by the constitutional laws of all the Member States . . . the
rights thereby guaranteed, far from constituting unfettered prerogatives, must be
viewed in light of the social function of the property and activities protected thereunder." Id. The ECJ further stated, "[ffor this reason, rights of this nature are protected
by law subject always to limitations laid down in accordance with the public interest."
Id. "Within the Community legal order it likewise seems legitimate that these rights
should, if necessary, be subject to certain limits justified by the overall objectives of the
Community, on condition that the substance of these rights is left untouched." Id.
271. Id.
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cluded that the property rights protected in the Community
legal order did not extend to mere commercial interests or opportunities, all of which possess inherent uncertainties. 7 2 In
contrast, the ECJ stated that the harms Nold claimed actually
stemmed from changes in economic circumstances rather than
2 73
the Decision's rules.
b. Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz
In Hauerv. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, German administrative authorities rejected the plaintiff-landowner's application for authorization to plant vines. 2 74 The authorities based their rejection on Council Regulation 1162/76275 which prohibited Mem-

ber States from authorizing any new planting of vines from the
effective date of the Regulation. 7 6 The Regulation's purpose
was to bring about a simultaneous common organization and
structural improvement of the wine market.2 7 7 The Regulation
sought to eliminate the Community's surplus in wine production2 78 in order to effect a short-term and long-term quantitative
balance2 79 and to achieve a qualitative improvement by ensuring
272. Id. at 508,
14, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 354-55. "As regards the guarantees
accorded to a particular undertaking, they can in no respect be extended to protect
mere commercial interests or opportunities, the uncertainties of which are part of the
very essence of economic activity." Id.
273. Id. at 508, 15, [1974] 2 C.ML.R. at 355.
274. Hauer, (1979] E.C.R. at 3740, 1 2, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 60-61.
275. Council Regulation No. 1162/76, O.J. L 135/32 (1976), amended by Council
Regulation No. 2776/78, O.J. L 333/1 (1978) (subsequent citations will be to full text
English version at O.J. L 135/32 (1976)).
276. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3740, 7, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 62; see Council Regulation No. 1162/76, supra note 275, art. 2, O.J. L 135/32, at 33 (setting forth terms of
prohibition on new planting). Council Regulation 1162/76 stated:
All new planting of vine varieties classified as wine grape varieties for the administrative unit concerned shall be prohibited during the period from 1 December 1976 to 30 November 1978. As from the date on which this Regulation enters into force, Member States shall no longer grant authorizations for
new planting.
Id.
277. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3747, 25, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 66.
278. Council Regulation No. 1162/76, supra note 275, art. 2, OJ. L 135/32, at 32.
The preamble to Council Regulation 1162/76 noted, "there will, on the average, be a
tendency in the next few years for production to exceed foreseeable needs." Id.
279. Id. In reference to potential surpluses in the wine production market, Council Regulation 1162/76 stated, "this situation calls for new guidelines aimed at putting a
brake on production and re-establishing the balance of the market in both the short
and the long term." Id.
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that surpluses did not form.28 0 The Council originally intended
the Regulation's prohibition to remain in effect for two years,
but Regulation 2776/7881 extended it for an additional year. 82

The plaintiff argued that the prohibition on the planting of
vines did not apply to her because she had submitted her application before the Regulation went into force. 8 3 The plaintiff
further argued that even if the Regulation applied to the plaintiff, the ECJ should not enforce it because it violated her right to
property and to pursue a trade or profession that the German
Constitution guaranteed. 8 4
The German administrative authority that heard the case
asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on whether the prohibition on new planting set forth in Regulation 1162/76 should apply retroactively and, if so, whether the prohibition covered all
land, regardless of its suitability for wine-growing.28 5 In its response to each of these questions, the ECJ looked at the purpose
of the prohibition and interpreted the Regulation's relevant language literally.2 6 The ECJ concluded that the Regulation prohibited all new plantings regardless of when the application was
filed and cited the Regulation's specification that the prohibition was to begin on the Regulation's effective date. 8 7 Citing
the Regulation's unconditional language, the ECJ further concluded that the prohibition applied to lands of all types and
clas28 8
sifications, regardless of their suitability for wine-growing.
280. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3742-43, 3748,
8, 11, 25, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 62.
281. Council Regulation No. 2776/78, O.J. L 333/1 (1978).
282. Opinion of Advocate General Capotorti, Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3752, 2,
[1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 47-48.
283. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3741, 4, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 61.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 3741-42, 5, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 61-62. In its order making the reference for a preliminary ruling, the German administrative authority stated that if the
Eq interpreted Regulation 1162/76 as setting forth a prohibition so general as to include even land suitable for wine growing, that prohibition might be inapplicable in
Germany due to incompatibility with the fundamental rights to property and to pursue
trade and professional activities that the German Constitution, guarantees. Id. at 3744,
1 13, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R at 63-64. The ECJ responded to this statement by pointing out
the rule that the ECJ will determine the question of a Community measure's possible
infringement of a fundamental right only by applying Community law. Id. at 3744,
14, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64.
286. See id. at 3742-44, 117-12, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 62-63 (quoting Regulation in
process of determining purpose behind prohibition).
287. Id. at 3742-43, 9 7-9, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 62-63.
288. Id. at 3743-44,
10-12, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 63.
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The ECJ began its analysis of the property rights issue by
examining Article 1 of Protocol 1.289 The ECJ found the articulation of a qualified right to the peaceful enjoyment of property in
Article 1 to be insufficient to answer the property rights question.2 90 After proceeding to examine several Member States'
constitutional provisions concerning property rights, the ECJ
concluded that the Regulation imposed a lawful restriction,
whether in similar or identical form, found in all the Member
291
States' constitutional systems.
In addition to determining the EC right to control planting
for the purposes the Regulation stated, the ECJ determined that
it was necessary to decide whether the Regulation's restrictions
were disproportionate to these purposes. 2 92 In order to ensure
that the prohibition did not impinge upon the right's substance,
the ECJ applied the principle of proportionality, which requires
that restrictions be reasonably related to the European Community's goal and means used.23 The ECJ found that because the
Regulation's aims of effecting a common organization and structural improvement of the wine market justified the planting restrictions imposed, the prohibition did not constitute a property
rights violation. 29 4 The ECJ emphasized the Regulation's temporary nature and stated that the European Community felt that it
289. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3745, 17, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64.
290. Id. at 3746, 19, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 65.
291. Id. at 3747, 22, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 66.
292. Id. at 3747, 23, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 66. The ECJ stated:
Even if it is not possible to dispute in principle the Community's ability to
restrict the exercise of the right to property in the context of a common organization of the market and for the purposes of a structural policy, it is still
necessary to examine whether the restrictions introduced by the provisions in
dispute in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the

Community or whether, with regard to the aim pursued, they constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference with the rights of the owner, impinging upon the very substance of the right to property.
Id.
293. Id. "It is... necessary to identify the aim pursued by the disputed regulation
and to determine whether there exists a reasonable relationship between the measures
provided for by the regulation and the aim pursued by the Community in this case." Id.
The principle of proportionality's reasonable relationship requirement mandates both
that the means be reasonably likely to achieve the purpose, and that the detriment to

those adversely affected not be disproportionate to the public's benefit. HARTLEY, supra
note 107, at 155.
294. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3749,

29-30, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 68. The ECJ

concluded that, "the [restriction on planting] is justified by the objectives of general
interest pursued by the Community and does not infringe the substance of the right to
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had to act immediately to rectify the problems in the wine market.2 95 The ECJ further pointed out that allowing new plantings
would result in greater surpluses and would make the implementation of structural reform more difficult in the future. 96
c. Wachauf v. State
In Wachaufv. State, Hubert Wachauf, a dairy farmer, applied
to Germany's Federal Office for Food and Forestry for compensation pursuant to a German law based on a Council Regulation 1 7 allowing milk producers that cease milk production permanently to apply for compensation for their discontinuance of
milk production. 98 The German law required applicants who
are tenant farmers to submit their landlord's written consent to
their discontinuance along with their applications for compensation.299 The German Federal Office for Food and Forestry denied Wachauf's request on the ground that the landlord of the
had withdrawn
farm he had been leasing for milk production
300
written consent to Wachauf's discontinuance.
The ECJ found that the farm Wachauf had leased qualified
as a holding 0 1 under the Regulation despite the farm's lack of
dairy cattle and milk production facilities and that the surrender
property in the form in which it is recognized and protected in the Community legal
order." Id. at 3749, 30, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 68.
295. Id. at 3749, 28, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 67-68. "It should be noted that, as
regards its sweeping scope, [Council Regulation 1162/76] is of a temporary nature. It
is designed to deal immediately with a conjectural situation characterized by surpluses,
whilst at the same time preparing permanent structural measures." Id.
296. Id. at 3749, 1 29, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 68. The ECJ also found that the Regulation did not infringe her right to pursue wine-production trade, citing Nold on that
right's social function and observing that the Regulation did not limit one's access to
that trade or one's freedom to practice wine-growing on land already devoted to it. Id.
at 3750, 32, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 68 (citing Nold, [1974] E.C.R. at 508, 14, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. at 354-55).
297. Council Regulation No. 857/84, art. 4(1)(a), OJ. L 90/13, at 14 (1984).
Council Regulation 857/84 states, "[iin order to complete the restructuring of milk
production at national or regional level or at the level of the collecting areas, the Member States may... grant to [milk] producers undertaking to discontinue production
definitively compensation paid in one or more annual payments." Id.
298. Wachauf, [1989] E.C.R. at 2634-35, 1 2, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 345.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 2635, 3, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 345.
301. Council Regulation No. 857/84, supra note 297, art. 12(d), OJ. L 90/13, at
16. Council Regulation 857/84 defines a holding as "all the production units operated
by the [milk] producer and located within the geographical territory of the Community
. .

..

I d.
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of such a farm upon the lease's expiration was a case having
comparable legal effects under a related Commission Regulation. °2 In coming to the second conclusion, the ECJ considered
the issue of whether finding such a surrender not to have comparable legal effects would infringe Wachaufs fundamental
rights by denying him compensation for giving up a production
quantity entitlement that he had worked to acquire. 0 3 The ECJ
referred to statements in Hauerthat the Member States' constitu-

tions inspire the ECJ's safeguarding of fundamental rights and
that restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights must be
proportionate to the restriction's purpose and must not impair
the rights' substance.3 0 4 The ECJ then proceeded to apply the

principle of proportionality. 0 It concluded that the language
of the regulations in question allowed Member State authorities
to interpret the regulations' rules so as to protect fundamental
rights."0 6 In the instant case, such protection could mean allowing tenant farmers in Wachauf's situation to keep all or part
of the entitlement if they chose to continue milk production or
compensating them if they gave up milk production perma30 7
nently

302. Wachauf, [1989] E.C.R. at 2635-36, 11 4-5, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 345-46. Commission Regulation 1371/84 states that certain rules that it set forth concerning the
application of Council Regulation 857/84 would "be applicable in other cases of transfer [of a milk producer's production quantity] which, under the various national rules,
have comparable legal effects as far as producers are concerned." Commission Regulation 1371/84, art. 5(3), O.J. L 132/11, at 13 (1984).
303. Wachauf, [1989] E.C.R. at 2639, 16, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 348.
304. Id. at 2639, 1 17-18, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 348-49. The ECJ noted:
Restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of [fundamental] rights, in particular in the context of a common organization of a market, provided that
those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued
by the Community and do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a
disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of
those rights.
Id.
305. Id. at 2639-40, 1 19-22, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 349-50.
306. Id. at 2640, 22, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 349-50. Council Regulation 857/84
and Commission Regulation 1371/84 "accordingly leave the competent national authorities a sufficiently wide margin of appreciation to enable them to apply [those Regulations' rules] in a manner consistent with the requirements of the protection of fundamental rights .... " Id.
307. Wachauf, (1989] E.C.R. at 2640, 1 22, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 349-50.
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D. The War in Yugoslavia and InternationalResponses
The war in Yugoslavia was the result of the conflicts and
power struggles s that erupted after the death of Josip Broz
Tito, 0 9 Yugoslavia's former leader.3 1 0 The U.N. Security Council
reacted to the Yugoslavian conflict by passing a series of Resolutions imposing an embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. sl '
Subsequent to the U.N. Security Council embargo, the European Community established its own embargo against Serbia

and Montenegro. s1 2

1. History of the War in Yugoslavia
The death ofJosip Broz Tito in 1980 left a power vacuum in
Yugoslavia that allowed national conflicts to surface. 1i During
Tito's reign, no national or ethnic conflicts had erupted in the
judicial, legislative, or executive branches of the Government because the Communist Party made all important decisions, with
Tito himself handling the most important issues.3 14 Tito's policy
308. See MOJZES, supra note 2, at 76-80 (discussing leadership vacuum which followed Tito's death and problems in Kosovo arising therefrom).
309. SINGLETON, supra note 3, at 190, 271. Josip Broz Tito was the half-Croat, halfSlovene Communist ruler of Yugoslavia from 1945 until his death in 1980. Id.
310. See DENITCH, supra note 3, at 59-61 (discussing changes in Yugoslavia's political climate from death of Tito to beginning of civil war).
311. See Bohr, supra note 5, at 260-62 (discussing U.N. Security Council's embargo
Resolutions).
312. See id. at 261 (describing European Community's embargo against Serbia and
Montenegro).
313. MojzEs, supra note 2, at 76-77. After the Axis powers' invasion of Yugoslavia
during World War II, they divided control over the various regions of Yugoslavia
amongst themselves. See SINGLETON, supra note 3, at 175-76 (describing partitioning of
Yugoslavia). In general, Croats and Muslims were allied with the Nazis. MOJZES, supra
note 2, at 75. Nazi Germany created the Independent State of Croatia (the "NDH"),
ruled by Nazi puppet Ante Pavelic, a Mussolini-backed Croat. SINGLETON, supra note 3,
at 175-76. The NDH included most of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Id. In addition to Croats, more than a million Serbs and three-quarters of a million Muslims lived
in the NDH, and during the war, Pavelic's militant group Ustasha attempted to exterminate the Serbs, sometimes with the help of Muslims. Id. at 177. At the close of the war,
there had been an estimated 350,000 to 750,000 Serb deaths. Id. The Ustasha also
carried out forced conversions of Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism. Id. at 180. In Serbia,
a Serbian nationalist group called Chetniks and Communist-led Partisans rebelled
against the Nazis. Id. The Partisans, with the help of the Soviet army, eventually took
power, transforming Yugoslavia into a Communist state. See id. at 203-04 (discussing
Partisans' road to victory in 1944 and 1945); see also DENrrCH, supra note 3, at 34 (discussing Partisans' resistance against Nazis as simultaneously one for "power and a new
social order . .

").

314. MoJzEs, supra note 2, at 76.
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concerning national strife had been to balance all national
claims and conflicts, punishing each side involved equally no
matter who was to blame so that no side could argue that it had
been discriminated against."1 5 After Tito's death, the Communist Party elite of the six Yugoslavian republics created nationalistic programs with clashing conceptions of how its members
should rule Yugoslavia. 1 6 By the end of the 1980s, the Communist Party fragmented into separate national Communist parties,
most of which adopted nationalist agendas.3 1 7 Some Communist
leaders dropped the title Communist in order to increase their
chances of being elected in the impending elections.3 1 8
Tensions between Serbs and Albanians in the Yugoslavian
province of Kosovo had escalated during last years of Tito's
rule.3 1 9 The minority Serbs suffered under the Albanian Communist elite in Kosovo and felt threatened by the Albanians'
high birthrate. 2 0 Slobodan Milosevic, who became the leader of
the Serbian Communist Party after Tito's death, 2 1 used the Kosovo problem to promote an increase in the power of a Serbia
that, according to him and his supporters, the federal structure
of Yugoslavia had oppressed.3 2 By pointing to Albanians' past
persecution of Serbs in Kosovo and vilifying Serb Communists
who opposed Serbia's regaining of rights and power, Milosevic
became the unrivaled leader of Yugoslavia and brought into his
315. Id.
316. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 50-51 (1993) (discussing increased ethnic politics
of Communists in 1980s in Yugoslavia); see also MOJZES, supra note 2, at 77-78 (describing effects of Tito's death on political situation in Yugoslavia, particularly reactions of
Communist Party leaders).
317. See MojzEs, supra note 2, at 81-82 (describing destruction of unified Communist Party); see also CRNOBRNJA, supra note 13, at 90-92 (discussing Communist Party's
transformation after Tito's death).
318. MojzEs, supra note 2, at 81.
319. See id. at 78-80 (discussing history and nature of ethnic conflict in Kosovo).
Kosovo is an autonomous region established within Serbia. Id. at 21. Kosovo is of historical importance to Serbs and is now 90% ethnically Albanian. Id. at 79. Since World
War II, Serbs and Albanians living there have clashed. Id. at 79. The Albanians have
pushed for either the annexation of Kosovo to Albania or the creation of a republic of
Kosovo within Yugoslavia. Id. at 79.
320. See MojzEs, supra note 2, at 78-79 (describing nature of dispute between Serbs
and Albanians living in Kosovo).
321. Id. at 78.
322. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 51-53 (describing Serbian President Milosevic's
politically-motivated appeal to Serbs' negative feelings toward Albanians in Kosovo); see
also MojzEs, supra note 2, at 78-80 (discussing Serbian President Milosevic's strategy for
attaining power in Serbia).
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administration Serbs from Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro,
and Kosovo. s2 s
In the late 1980s, Milosevic began endorsing the notion of a
Greater Serbia that would necessitate the annexation of all territories in which Serbs currently, or even in the past, lived in significant numbers.3 24 Beginning in 1989, the Yugoslavian Army
agreed with this notion and supported Serbian ideas of what was
best for Yugoslavia.32 5 In 1991, the Serb minorities in the
Krajina region of Croatia staged a revolt against the regional
Government that soon escalated into a war involving the Yugoslavian Army. 32 6 At first, the Army claimed only to be serving as a
mediator, but it was in reality assisting the Serbs.327 Fueling the
revolt were Krajina Serbs' hostility toward the idea of rule by an
independent Croatian Government and their desire that Yugoslavia not break up into a number of fragments. 2 The SerbCroat war ended in 1992 with an agreement to cease fighting,
and the United Nations brought in peacekeeping soldiers to deter the resumption of hostilities.
After the Bosnian multiparty elections in late 1990 in which
each of the nationalist parties swept its own ethnic constituency,3 3 0 Serb minorities in Bosnia seceded from the Bosnian

Government and established their own republic, the Republika
Srpska.3 3 In April 1992, the Yugoslavian Army began waging war
in Bosnia against the Bosnian Government.332 At first, the Army
wanted to prevent Bosnia's secession from Yugoslavia, but when
international recognition of Bosnia made that goal appear im323. See MojzEs, supra note 2, at 80-81 (describing Milosevic's rise to power in Serbia).
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id. at 69.
Id. at 68-69.
DENrrcH, supra note 3, at 180.
See Mojzrs, supra note 2, at 100-01 (describing Yugoslavian Army's pro-Serb

activities in Croatia). The Serbian Government in Belgrade actively supported the
Serbs in Croatia, and one theory is that Milosevic and his supporters in the Serbian
Government and the Yugoslavian Army instigated and then directed the conflict. See id.
at 100 (arguing that such scenario is most likely).
328. COHEN, supra note 1, at 225.
329. MojzEs, supra note 2, at 105.
330. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 146-47 (discussing Bosnian elections of 1990).
331. MojzEs, supra note 2, at 107. Republika Srpska literally means "Republic Ser-

bian" in Serbo-Croatian. Id. Bosnian Serbs named the city of Banja Luka as the capital
of Republika Srpska. CRNOBRNJA, supra note 13, at 185.
332. MojzEs, supra note 2, at 107.
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possible, the Yugoslavian Army began supporting the Bosnian
Serbs, who claimed to want to separate from Bosnia so as to remain united with other Serbs."' 5 In addition, the Yugoslavian
Government aided the Bosnian Serbs in their fight against allied
Croat and Muslim forces with military, financial, medical, diplomatic, transportation, and other forms of assistance.33 4 This support quickly resulted in the Bosnian Serbs' seizure of seventy
percent of Bosnian territory."' 5 In addition to Serbs fighting
Muslims and, to a lesser extent, Croats, there were hostilities between Muslims and Croats, who were trying to seize their own
33
piece of Bosnia. 1
2. The U.N. Security Council Resolutions Instituting the
Embargo Against Yugoslavia
From 1991 until 1992, the U.N. Security Council passed a
series of Resolutions in response to the situation in Yugoslavia
out of concern for the conflict's potential threat to world peace
and security.3 3 7 Among these Resolutions was Resolution 713,
which imposed a total arms embargo on Yugoslavia.3 3 1 In addition, Resolution 757 imposed a total trade embargo on Yugoslavia and provided for the freezing of funds owned by or destined
for Yugoslavian authorities or undertakings.3 3 9 Resolution 787
prohibited the transshipment through Yugoslavia of certain essential products and defined a Yugoslavian vessel for the pur333. Id.
334. Id. at 108; see COHEN, supra note 1, at 240 (describing Belgrade's assistance of

Serbs fighting in Bosnia).
335. MoJZs, supra note 2, at 108. But see CRNOBRNJA, supra note 13, at 187 (argu-

ing that Serb gains in Bosnia amounted to much less than 70%). By 1993, the MuslimCroat alliance had collapsed and fighting broke out between those groups as well.
MOJZES, supra note 2, at 109.
336. CRNOBRNJA, supra note 13, at 183.
337. See, e.g., Resolution 713, supra note 5, at 3, 1 6 (imposing total arms embargo
on Yugoslavia); Resolution 757, supra note 5, at 3-4, 4 (imposing total trade embargo
on Yugoslavia); Resolution 787, supra note 5, at 3, 1 9 (prohibiting transshipment

through Yugoslavia of certain essential products and defining Yugoslavian vessel for
purposes of implementing relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions); Resolution 820,

supra note 5, at 4-6, 11 13, 22, 24 (strengthening U.N. embargo on Yugoslavia by
prohibiting transport of all commodities across Yugoslavian border and by providing
for impounding of various types of vehicles in which Yugoslavian entity holds majority
or controlling interest); Bohr, supra note 5, at 260-62 (discussing U.N. Security Coun-

cil's actions concerning conflict in Yugoslavia).
338. Resolution 713, supra note 5, at 3,

1

339. Resolution 757, supra note 5, at 3-4,

6.

1 4,5.
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poses of implementing relevant resolutions . 3 ° Resolution 820
strengthened the U.N. embargo by prohibiting the transport of
all commodities across the Yugoslavian border, with certain exceptions, and by providing for the impounding of various types
of vehicles in which a Yugoslavian entity holds a majority or controlling interest. 41
a. Resolution 713 (1991)
In Resolution 713 of September 25, 1991, the Security
Council began by noting its concern about the fighting taking
place in Yugoslavia, as well as the consequences this fighting
could have for other countries in the Balkans region and for international peace and security in general.142 After urging all the
warring parties to obey earlier cease-fire agreements and to try to
arrive at a peaceful resolution of their disputes through negotiation at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 43 the Security Council declared in Resolution 713 that all
340. Resolution 787, supra note 5, at 3-4,
9, 10.
341. Resolution 820, supra note 5, at 5-6, 11 22, 24.
342. Resolution 713, supra note 5, at 1, pmbl. In Resolution 713, the Security
Council stated that it was "[d]eeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia which is
causing a heavy loss of human life and material damage, and by the consequences for
the countries of the region, in particular in the border areas of neighboring countries."
Id. It also expressed its concern "that the continuation of this situation constitutes a
threat to international peace and security." Id.
343. VojTECH MASTHw,

HELSINKI, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND EUROPEAN SECUIT

32

(1986). The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe ("CSCE") is an international conference of all North American and European states in which the participants address at length various security concerns in Europe. Id. The first meeting of
the CSCE began in Helsinki on July 3, 1973, continued in Geneva from September 18,
1975, and concluded in Helsinki on August 1, 1975. 1975 Final Act of the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in FROM HELSINKI TO VIENNA: BASIC DocuMENTS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS 43 (Arie Bloed ed., 1990). Representatives of Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the
German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States, and the former
Yugoslavia participated in the Conference. Id. The participating states signed the Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe ("Final Act"), in which
they articulated a number of principles and made various affirmations concerning security matters and international relations. Id. at 43-54. The Final Act also contained a
number of agreements by the states to co-operate in the future in various fields, including technology, science, the environment, commercial exchanges, industry, trade, tourism, humanitarian fields, information, culture, and education. Id. at 54-98. The Final
Act concluded with the states' resolution to "continue the multilateral process initiated
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states should, in order to establish peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately carry out a general and total embargo on the
delivery of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.'
Finally, the Security Council decided to maintain involvement with
the conflict in Yugoslavia until the achievement of a peaceful
resolution.3 4 5
b. Resolution 757 (1992)
In Resolution 757 of May 30, 1992, the Security Council imposed a trade embargo on Yugoslavia.on The Security Council
began Resolution 757 of May 30, 1992 by reaffirming previous
resolutions concerning the war in Yugoslavia.34 7 The Security
Council further stated that it deplored that the parties involved
in the war had not complied with the demands the Security
Council had made in Resolution 752348 of 1992.111 Resolution
752 had demanded that the fighting in Bosnia stop immediately,
that all types of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including interference by the Yugoslavian Army and by
Croatian Army forces, end immediately, and that all non-army
units in Bosnia and Herzegovina be broken up and disarmed."'
by the Conference" by organizing meetings among their representatives. Id. at 99. The
most recent meeting of the CSCE took place in December 1994, in Budapest. See Europe's Post-post-cold-warDefences Wobble into Action, ECONOMisr, Dec. 10, 1994, at 45-46
(discussing December, 1994, meeting of CSCE).
344. Resolution 713, supra note 5, at 3,
6. The Security Council decided that,
.all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and
military equipment to Yugoslavia...." Id. On November 22, 1995, the U.N. Security
Council decided to end the arms embargo on Yugoslavia, with the termination to take
place in stages. S.C. Res. 1021, U.N. SCOR, 3595th Mtg., at 1-2, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1021 (1995). The termination of the arms embargo became complete in June 1996.
Security Council PermanentlyLifts Sanctions, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 1, 1996, available
in LEXIS, Nexis library, World News file.
345. Resolution 713, supra note 5, at 3,
8.
346. See Resolution 757, supra note 5, at 3-4, 11 4(b), 4(c) (setting forth details of
trade embargo on Yugoslavia). On October 1, 1996, the U.N. Security Council terminated the trade embargo on Yugoslavia, although it stated that it would consider
reimposing sanctions on Yugoslavia if it did not abide by the peace agreement it had
signed in late 1995. S.C. Res. 1074, U.N. SCOR, 3700th Mtg., at 1, 2, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1074 (1996).
347. Resolution 757, supra note 5, at 1, pmbl. (listing prior Resolutions addressing
Yugoslavian conflict).
348. S.C. Res. 752, U.N. SCOR, 3075th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/752 (1992) [hereinafter Resolution 752].
349. Resolution 757, supra note 5, at 1-2, pmbl.
350. Resolution 752, supra note 346, at 2,
1, 3, 5.
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The Security Council then declared that all states must prevent
the import into their territories of all commodities and products
that are exported from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."5 ' It
also decided that all states should prevent any activities by their
own nationals or activities in or from their territories that carry
3 52
out or promote trade with or involving any Yugoslavian entity.
In addition, the Security Council concluded that no state
should allow any funds or other economic resources to become
available to Yugoslavian authorities or to any commercial entity,
industrial entity, or public utility located in Yugoslavia, or allow
the transfer of such funds or resources to these Yugoslavian entities, with an exception for payments for medical and humanitarian purposes and food. 53 Resolution 757 added, however, that
the trade and financial embargo would not extend to the transshipment through Yugoslavia of commodities and products that
originated outside of Yugoslavia and were temporarily present
there only for the purpose of transshipment.354 In Resolution
757, the Security Council also called on all states to deny all aircraft intending to land in or having taken off from Yugoslavia,
permission to take off from, land in, or fly over their territory,
unless the Committee of the Security Council (the "Committee") that Resolution 724 established3 55 approved the flight for
humanitarian or other purposes.3 56 Finally, Resolution 757 required states to prohibit the servicing of aircraft registered in
Yugoslavia and the provision of parts and airworthiness certification for such aircraft.5 57
351. Resolution 757, supra note 5, at 3, 4(a). The Security Council decided, "all
States shall prevent: (a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution .... " Id.
352. See id. at 3-4,
4(b), 4(c) (outlining details of prohibitions required of
States, including exception for food and medical supplies).
353. Id. at 4, 5.
354. Id. at 4, 6.
355. See S.C. Res. 724, U.N. SCOR, 3023rd Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/724 (1991), at
1-2, 1 5(b) (deciding to establish Committee of Security Council). Among the Committee's functions would be "[t]o consider any information brought to its attention by
States concerning violations of the embargo," to recommend to the Security Council
ways in which the embargo could be made more effective, and "[t]o recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the . . . [arms] embargo." Id. at 2,
5(b) (iii), 5(b) (iv).
356. Resolution 757, supra note 5, at 4, 7(a).
357. Id. at 4, 7(b).
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c. Resolution 787 (1992)
In Resolution 787 of November 16, 1992, the U.N. Security
Council prohibited the transshipment through Yugoslavia of certain essential products and defined a Yugoslavian vessel for the
purposes of implementing relevant Security Council resolutions.35 s Resolution 787 reaffirmed Resolution 713 and subsequent resolutions relevant to the war in Yugoslavia and expressed concern about information the Security Council had received concerning continued violations of the arms and trade
embargo s5 9 Resolution 787 went on to condemn acts that deliberately impeded the transport of medical and food supplies to
civilians in Bosnia."6 In Resolution 787, the Security Council
further prohibited the transshipment of a number of important
products, including crude oil, coal, energy-related equipment,
aircraft, and motors of all types, unless the Committee were to
specifically authorize such a transshipment on a case-by-case basis. 6 1 The Security Council made this decision so as to guarantee that no one could succeed in diverting in violation of Resolution 757 commodities and products shipped through Yugoslavia.6 Finally, the Security Council deemed, for purposes of
carrying out the embargo, all vessels in which a Yugoslavian entity held a majority or controlling interest to be a vessel of Yugoslavia, without regard to the flag under which it sailed. 6
d. Resolution 820 (1993)
In Resolution 820 of April 17, 1993, the Security Council
once again addressed the conflict in Yugoslavia.3 64 The preamble of Resolution 820 included a condemnation of all violations
358. Resolution 787, supra note 5, at 3-4,

1

9, 10.

359. Id. at 1-2, pmbl.
360. Id. at 3, 7.
361. Id. at 3-4, 9.
362. Id.
363. Resolution 787, supra note 5, at 4,
10. The Security Council decided:
[A]ny vessel in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or

undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) shall be considered, for the purpose of implementation of
the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, a vessel of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) regardless of the flag under which
the vessel sails ....

Id.
364. Resolution 820, supra note 5, at 1, pmbl.
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of Resolutions 757 and 787 occurring between the territory of
Yugoslavia and Serb-controlled regions of Croatia and Bosnia. a
The body of Resolution 820 referred specifically to the Bosnian
Serbs in several places,M 6 and it stated that the provisions of Resolution 820 would come into force only if the Bosnian Serbs
either continued to refrain from signing the peace plan that the
Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims had signed or resumed
military activities after the signing of the peace plan.367 Among
the provisions of Resolution 820 was a prohibition of all transshipments of products and commodities through Yugoslavia on
the Danube River unless the Committee specifically authorized
the transshipments. 3s
Resolution 820 contained a provision requiring states to
freeze funds that Yugoslavian authorities, businesses, and public
utilities owned or controlled indirectly or directly and that any
persons or entities within the states held.s6 9 Resolution 820 also
expanded the transshipment prohibition in Resolution 787 to
apply to the transport of any commodities or products across Yugoslavia's land borders or to or from its ports. 7° Resolution 820
further required all states to impound certain classes of vehicles,
including aircrafts, within their territories, in which a Yugoslavian entity held a majority or controlling interest.3 7 1 According to
Resolution 820, the entities holding these possessions could have
to forfeit them to the state seizing them upon the conclusion
365. Id.
366. See id. at 2, 1 3, 5 (expressing concern at Bosnian Serbs' refusal to accept all
of peace plan, and demanding that all parties in Bosnia, in particular Bosnian Serbs,
cooperate with and ensure safety of personnel of U.N. Protective Force and humanitarian agencies).
367. Id. at 3, 1 10-11.
368. Id. at 4, 1 15.
369. Resolution 820, supra note 5, at 5, 21.
370. Id. at 5, 1 22(a)-(c). Resolution 820 included exceptions for food, medical
and other humanitarian supplies, and any other goods which the Committee authorized on an exceptional basis. Id.
371. Id. at 6, 1 24. The Security Council decided:
(A)II States shall impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft
in their territories in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) and that these vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock
and aircraft may be forfeit to the seizing State upon a determination that they
have been in violation of Resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or
the present resolution ....
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that the possessions have been in violation of Resolutions 713,
757, 787, or 820.372 Related to this forfeiture and impoundment
provision is the requirement in Resolution 820 that states detain
pending investigation all vehicles and cargoes of certain classes
within their territories that authorities suspect of violating the
same four resolutions.
Upon a conclusion that the vehicles
and cargoes under suspicion have violated any of those resolutions, Resolution 820 provides for their impounding and, if appropriate, forfeiture to the state detaining them. 74
3. EC Council Regulations Establishing the Embargo on
Yugoslavia
The European Community responded to the U.N. Security
Council resolutions establishing an embargo on Yugoslavia by
passing regulations imposing a similar embargo. 5 After referring to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 752 and 757, Council
Regulation 1432/92 ofJune 1, 1992,76 imposed a total trade embargo on the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. 37 In addition, Regulation 1432/92 prohibited the provision to legal and

Id.

372. Id. Specifically, paragraph 24 states that the Security Council:
[D]ecides that all States shall impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling
stock and aircraft in their territories in which a majority or controlling interest
is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from [Yugoslavia] and that
these [properties] may be forfeit to the seizing State upon a determination
that they have been in violation of [the four embargo resolutions].

373. Resolution 820, supra note 5, at 6, 1 25.
374. Id.
375. See Bohr, supra note 5, at 260-62 (discussing initial cautious EC reaction to
conflict in Yugoslavia and measures it adopted in 1992); see also Council Regulation No.
1432/92, supra note 11, pmbl., art. 1, OJ L 151/4, at 4 (1992) (referring to U.N. Security Council's embargo resolutions and setting forth terms of EC embargo on Republics
of Serbia and Montenegro); Council Regulation 990/93, supra note 11, pmbl., O.J. L
102/14, at 14 (1993) (referring to U.N. Security resolutions imposing embargo on Yugoslavia in strengthening embargo it had previously established).
376. Council Regulation No. 1432/92, supra note 11, pmbl., O.J. L 151/4 at 4
(1992).
377. Id. arts. 1(a), I(b), O.J L 151/4, at 4 (1992). Council Regulation 1432/92
stated:
As of 31 May 1992, the following shall be prohibited:
(a) the introduction into the territory of the Community of all commodities
and products originating in or coming from the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro; (b) the export to (those Republics] of all commodities and products
originating in or coming from the Community ....
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natural persons in the republics of Serbia and Montenegro of
non-financial services whose purpose or effect was to benefit indirectly or directly the economy of those republics.1 8 Regulation 1432/92 also prohibited such non-financial services to all
organizations that exercised an economic activity and that residents or organizations of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro controlled.3 7 9

Finally, Regulation 1432/92 prohibited in

particular the provision of non-financial services in order to benefit any economic activity undertaken in or from the republics of
Serbia and Montenegro.38

0

The Regulation created exceptions

for the export of medical supplies and foodstuffs and for activities promoting their export to those republics.3 8 '
An Annex to Regulation 1432/92382 provided the terms of
the prohibition on air transport services.3 8 3 The Annex man-

dated the denial of permission to any aircraft to take off from,
land in, or fly over EC Member State territory if it was traveling
to or from Serbian or Montenegrin territory, unless the Committee that U.N. Security Council Resolution 724 created approved
the flight.3 84 Regulation 3534/92 of December 7, 1992,385
amended Regulation 1432/92 by inserting a prohibition on the
transshipment of products nearly identical to that of Resolution
787386 and by adding Annex II defining a vessel of the republics
of Serbia and Montenegro for the purpose of carrying out Regu378. Id. art. 1(d)(i)-(ii), O.J L 151/4, at 4 (1992).

Council Regulation 1432/92

prohibited "the provision of non-financial services whose object or effect it is, directly or
indirectly, to promote the economy of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro .... "
Id. art. l(d), O.J L 151/4, at 4 (1992).
379. 1&. art. I(d)(ii), O.J L 151/4, at 4 (1992).
380. Id. art. I(d)(i), O.J L 151/4, at 4 (1992).
381. Council Regulation No. 1432/92, supra note 11, arts. 2(a), 2(c), OJ L 151/4,
at 5 (1992).
382. Id. annex, O.J L 151/4, at 6 (1992).
383. Id.
384. Id. The Annex stated:
Permission shall be denied to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly
the territory of the Community if it is destined to land in or has taken off from
the territory of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, unless the particular
flight has been approved.., by the Committee established by Security Council
Resolution 724 (1991).
Id.
385. Council Regulation No. 3534/92, O.J L 358/16 (1992).
386. See id. art. 2, O.J L 358/16, at 16 (1992) (prohibiting transshipment of "crude
oil, petroleum products, omission energy-related equipment, metals, chemicals, rubber,
tyres, vehicles, aircraft and motors of all types .. ").
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38 7
lation 1432/92 and related legislation.

Council Regulation 2656/9238 expressed the Community's
concern that the EC embargo on Yugoslavia might not be effectively applied. 309 The European Community also expressed its
belief that in order to ensure the effectiveness of the embargo it
was necessary to control exports from the European Community.39 0 In furtherance of this goal, the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe established Sanctions Assistance
Missions 9 ' in the Republic of Croatia and the territory of the
former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, but not in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.3 9 2 The Sanction Assistance Missions enabled Croatian and Macedonian authorities to control
the exports from or through their territory to the republics of
3 93
Serbia and Montenegro.
Council Regulation 40/93, the amended version of Regulation 2656/92, subjected all exports of products or commodities
to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina originating in or coming
from the European Community to prior Member State authorization. 9 4 Regulation 40/93 conditioned the issuance of such
prior export authorization on the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina's issuance of an import license. 9 5 Council Regulation 40/
93 also required that Bosnian authorities confirm the authorized
goods' arrival. 3 96
387. Council Regulation No. 3534/92, supra note 385, art. 3, O.J L 358/16, at 16
(1992).
388. Council Regulation No. 2656/92, O.J L 266/27 (1992), amended by OJ. L 7/1
(1993) (subsequent citations will be to full text, English version, at O.J. L 7/1 (1993),
unless otherwise indicated).
389. Id. pmbl., OJ L 266/27, at 27 (1992).
390. Id.
391. Council Regulation No. 40/93, pmbl., OJ L 7/1, at 1 (1993). The "system of
Sanctions Assistance Missions enables the competent authorities of the Republic of Croatia and of the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to control effectively the exports from or through its territory to the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro." Id. The Sanctions Assistance Mission in Macedonia operates under the "joint
aegis of the European Union and the... Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe." Beating the Sanctions on Serbia, ECONOMIST, July 2, 1994, at 49.
392. Council Regulation No. 40/93, supra note 391, pmbl., O.J L 7/1, at 1.
393. Id.
394. Id. art. 1, O.J. L 7/1, at 1 (1993).
395. Id. art. 2, O.J. L 7/1, at 1 (1993).
396. Id.
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4. EC Council Regulation 990/93 Strengthening the Embargo
In Council Regulation 990/93 of April 26, 1993, the European Community expressed a need to strengthen the embargo
that Council Regulations 1432/92 and 2656/92 established. 97
A number of observations set forth in Regulation 990/93 concerning the tragedy in Yugoslavia propelled the European Community to adopt this Regulation.398 Among these observations
were that Serbia and Montenegro's extended direct and indirect
activities in and concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina were the major
cause of the problems there and that the continuation of those
activities would bring about additional deaths and property damage and further disrupt international peace and security in that
region.3 9 The European Community also observed in Regulation 990/93 that the Bosnian Serb party had not yet accepted
the International Conference on Yugoslavia's peace plan in full,
that additional violations of the existing embargo on Yugoslavia
had to be prevented, and that the U.N. Security Council had
adopted Resolution 820 for the purpose of strengthening the
embargo of Yugoslavia that Resolutions 713, 757, and 787 established.400 Regulation 990/93 further stated that the European
Community and its Member States had agreed to avail themselves, if necessary, of an EC act so as to ensure consistent imple397. Council Regulation No. 990/93, supra note 11, pmbl., OJ. L 102/14, at 14
(1993).
398. See id. pmbl., O.J. L 102/14, at 14 (1993) (setting forth EC understanding of
Yugoslavian situation).
399. Id.
400. Id. Council Regulation 990/93 noted:
[F] urther violations of the existing embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in particular by their transit through this Republic and by activities carried out between this Republic and the Serb- controlled areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the United Nations Protected Areas
in the Republic of Croatia have to be prevented; [and that] the United Nations Security Council ... has adopted Resolution 820 (1993), in order to
strengthen the embargo of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), decided upon in Resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992) and 787
(1992); [and that] under these conditions, the Community has to strengthen
the embargo of [Yugoslavia] as established by Council Regulations (EEC) No
1432/92 and (EEC) No 2656/92 ....
Id. The Council also stated that the European Community and the Member States had
decided "that measures [had] to be taken to dissuade the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro from further violating the integrity and security of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to induce the Bosnian Serb party to cooperate in the restoration of peace
in this Republic. ..

."

Id.
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mentation of particular U.N. Resolutions and EC Regulations." 1
Most of the provisions of Regulation 990/93 reproduced, to
a great extent, embargo measures that U.N. Security Council resolutions had imposed. 4° Article 8 required that competent
Member State authorities impound certain classes of vehicles, including aircrafts, in which a Yugoslavian entity held a majority or
controlling interest4 05 Article 9 mandated that all competent

Member State authorities detain pending investigation vehicles
that Article 8 covered as well as cargo that authorities suspected
to have violated Regulation 1432/92 or Regulation 990/93. 4°
Regulation 990/93 defined the scope of its application as all EC

Member State territory, including Member State air space and
any aircraft or vessel under a Member State's jurisdiction, as well
as all Member State nationals and any entity incorporated or
constituted under a Member State's law.4 °5
Council Regulation 462/96 suspended Regulation 990/
401. Id. Regulation 990/93 did not specify which resolutions or regulations it was
referring to, vaguely stating that the European Community and its Member States "have
agreed to have recourse to a Community instrument, inter alia, in order to ensure a
uniform implementation throughout the Community of certain of these measures." Id.
402. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3961, 14,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 276.
403. Council Regulation No. 990/93, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. L 102/14, at 16
(1993). Article 8's exact language is:
All vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in which a majority or
controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be impounded by the competent authorities of the Member States.
Id. Article 24 of Resolution 820 (1993) contains language very similar to that of Regulation 990/93's Article 8. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bosphorus, [1996]
E.C.R. at 1-3959, 1-3961, 11 8, 14, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 275, 276 (quoting Article 24 of
Resolution 820 and Article 8 of Regulation 990/93).
404. Council Regulation No. 990/93, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. L 102/14, at 16
(1993). Article 25 of Resolution 820 (1993) contains language very similar to that of
Article 9 of Regulation 990/93. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bosphorus,
[1996] E.C.R. at 1-3959, 1-3961,
9, 14, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 275, 276 (quoting Article
25 of Resolution 820 and Article 9 of Regulation 990/93).
405. Council Regulation No. 990/93, supra note 11, art. 11, OJ. L 102/14, at 16
(1993). Article 8 of Council Regulation 990/93 provided:
This Regulation shall apply within the territory of the Community, including
its air space and in any aircraft or vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member
State, and to any person elsewhere who is a national of a Member State and
any body elsewhere which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a
Member State.
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The suspension took effect on February 27, 1996. 4°

Reg-

ulation 462/96 provided for the release of any funds or assets
that Member States had frozen or impounded under any of the
EC embargo regulations.4 °8
II. THE BOSPHORUS CASE
In the Bosphorus decision, the ECJ held that Council Regulation 990/93 applied to an aircraft owned by the Yugoslavian National Airline and leased to a Turkish airline in which no Yugoslavian entity held a majority or controlling interest.409 The Irish
High Court had held that the regulation did not apply, 410 and
on appeal, the Supreme Court of Ireland" I made a reference to
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling regarding the question whether
Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 applied to a Yugoslavian-owned
aircraft leased to a non-Yugoslavian entity.41 2 In coming to their
respective conclusions on this question, the Advocate General
and the ECJ interpreted Regulation 990/93 with respect to its
language, its context, and its purpose.41 3 In addition, they employed the principle of proportionality in finding that the impounding in question did not violate the airline's right to property as protected in Community law.414
406. Council Regulation No. 426/96, art. 1(1), OJ. L 65/1 at 1 (1996).
407. Id. art. 2, OJ. L 65/1 at 1 (1996).
408. Id. art. 1(2), OJ. L 65/1 at 1 (1996).
409. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3987, 27, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 296.
410. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Minister for
Transport, Energy and Communications, Ireland and Attorney General and TEAM Aer
Lingus Ltd, [1994] 2 I.L.R.M. 551, 560, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 464, 472 (High Court of
Ireland, Murphy, J.).
411. MURDOCH, supra note 34, at 489. The Supreme Court of Ireland is the court
of final appeal in Ireland. Id. One of the Supreme Court's functions is to hear appeals
from the Irish High Court. Id.
412. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3981, 1 6, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 292.
413. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-396670, 11 33-47, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 281-85 (stating rule concerning interpretation of
Community law provisions and interpreting Regulation 990/93 in accordance there11-18, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293with); see also Bosphorus, [19961 E.C.R. at 1-3983-84,
94 (stating rule concerning interpretation of Community law provisions and interpreting Regulation 990/93 in accordance therewith).
414. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bosphorns, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-397177,
48-69, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 285-91 (applying principle of proportionality to impounding in context of property-rights issue); see also Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-398587, 11 19-26, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 294-96 (explaining EC conception of right to property and applying it to impounding in question using principle of proportionality).

1062

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 20:1007

A. Background of the Bosphorua Case
Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS ("Bosphorus")
is an airline incorporated in Turkey and owned by Turkish citizens.4 15 Mustafa Ozbay, a Turkish citizen who managed Bosphorus, owned ninety-six per-cent of Bosphorus' shares. 4 16 Bosphorus signed a lease agreement with the national airline of Yugoslavia ('JAT") on April 17, 1992, 4' 7 under which Bosphorus leased
two Boeing 737-300 aircrafts from JAT for a period of forty-eight
months.4 18 The lease was a dry lease, which meant that Bosphorus had to provide its own cabin and flight crew for the aircrafts. 4 19 Bosphorus retained complete day-to-day direction and
operational control of the aircrafts. 42 ° The lease provided that
JAT retained ownership of the aircrafts but that Bosphorus had
the right to register them in Turkey, which it did.42 1 The Turkish certificates of registration for the aircrafts identified their
owner as JAT and their operator as Bosphorus.42
Bosphorus
paid a deposit of US$1,000,000 for each aircraft, and the lease
provided for a monthly rental payment of US$150,000 for each
42 3
aircraft.
After the aircrafts' delivery, Bosphorus exercised complete
control over them.42 4 The cabin and flight crews were Bosphorus employees. 42 5 Bosphorus alone determined the two aircrafts'
destination, and Bosphorus used them exclusively to run its tour
operations.4 2 6 From the time of their delivery, the aircrafts
never returned to Yugoslavia or any states of the former Yugosla415. Opinion of Advocate Generaljacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3962, 1 19,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 277.
416. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Minister for
Transport and Others (Jan. 22, 1996) (High Court of Ireland), available in LEXIS, International Law Library, All Commonwealth Cases/Summaries File, at *4 [hereinafter
Bosphorus High Court 1996 Decision].
417. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3980, 1 2, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 291.
418. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3962-63, 1
20, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 277.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Bosphorus, [1994] 2 I.L.R.M. at 554-555, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 466-67.
424. Id. at 555, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 467.
425. Id.
426. Id.
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via, traveling among Turkey, most of the EU Member States,4 27
and Switzerland.42 8 JAT never had any direct or indirect interest
in Bosphorus or in the management, supervision, or direction of
its business.4 9 JAT's only interest during the term of the lease
was its right to receive the monthly rental payments and its right
to due performance by Bosphorus of the other conditions of the
lease. 430 These conditions included that Bosphorus would be
responsible for the aircrafts' maintenance and pay for the running costs of the aircrafts except for insurance, which JAT would
pay. 4 3 1 Shortly after delivery of the planes, the Council enacted
Regulation 1432/92 which prohibited Bosphorus' payment of
the monthly rentals.43 2 Thereafter, Bosphorus paid the rental
amounts into a blocked account with the Turkish Central Bank
from which JAT could not remove funds without the Bank's approval.433 JAT became unable to pay the aircrafts' insurance premiums, as required by the lease, and, thus, Mustafa Ozbay arranged for insurance in London.434
On April 16, 1993, Bosphorus flew one of the aircrafts to
Dublin, Ireland to have Team Aer Lingus Limited ("Team Aer
Lingus"), the aircraft maintenance subsidiary of Aer Lingus, conduct an overhaul and maintenance service of the aircrafts.435
Team Aer Lingus completed the service on May 28, 1993, but as
the aircraft was about to depart from Dublin Airport, the Irish
Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications43 6 delayed
427. Id.
428. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3963, 22,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 278.
429. Id.
430. Bosphorus, [1994] 2 I.L.R.M. at 555, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 467-68.
431. Bosphorus High Court 1996 Decision, supra note 416, at *7.
432. Id. at *8.
433. Id. Advocate General Jacobs, however, states in his Opinion that the Turkish
Central Bank operated the blocked account "in accordance with its national legislation
enforcing U.N. sanctions [against Yugoslavia]." Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs,
Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3964, 27, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 279.
434. Bosphorus High Court 1996 Decision, at *8.
435. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3963, 1 23,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 278.
436. Telephone interview with Noelle Gleason, Office of the Consulate General of
Ireland, New York, N.Y. (Feb. 13, 1997). The Irish Minister for Transport, Energy and
Communications is responsible for the formulation of national policies connected with
aviation, rail, and road transport, the supply and use of energy in all its forms, the
exploration and development of mineral and petroleum, and postal, radio, and telecommunications matters. Id.
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its flight clearance.4 37 Team Aer Lingus' Secretary wrote Ozbay
a letter the next day explaining that Team Aer Lingus had
sought an opinion from the U.N. Sanctions Committee.
through the Irish Government as to whether Bosphorus' use of
the aircraft was in violation of the U.N. embargo. 43 9 Subsequent
to that letter, on June 4, 1993, the Irish Minister for Tourism and
Trade' passed regulations giving full effect to EC Council Regulation 990/93. 4 1 On June 8, 1993, the Minister for Transport,
Energy and Communications ordered the aircraft impounded
pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation .990/93 on the ground that a
Yugoslavian entity held a majority or controlling interest in the
aircraft. 442 The U.N. Sanctions Committee provided its opinion
on the matter in a letter dated June 14, 1993, stating that the
provision of services to the aircraft would have violated relevant
U.N. embargo resolutions and that the Irish authorities should
have already impounded the aircraft under Article 24 of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 820.13
As a consequence of the Minister's impounding of the aircraft, Turkish authorities in Istanbul impounded Bosphorus'
other aircraft under the JAT lease on the ground that Turkish
law 4 required an airline to have at least two aircraft in operation in order to carry on its business." 5 As of January 22, 1996,
the aircraft remained detained at the airport and was incurring
437. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3963, 1 23,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 278.
438. Bosphorus, [1994] 2 I.L.R.M. at 556, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 468. The U.N. Sanctions Committee was created pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 724 (1991).
Resolution 724, supra note 353, at 1-2, 5(b).
439. Bosphorus, [1994] 2 I.L.R.M. at 556, [1994] 3 C.M.LR at 468.
440. Telephone interview with Noelle Gleason, Office of the Consulate General of
Ireland, New York, N.Y. (Feb. 3, 1997). The Irish Minister for Tourism and Trade is

responsible for the formulation of national policy connected with tourism and trade
matters. Id.
441. Bosphorus, [1994] 2 I.L.R.M. at 556, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 468.
442. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3963, 1 23,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 278.
443. Id. at 1-3963-64,
24, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 278-79.
444. Telephone interview with John Doyle, attorney with Dillon Eustace, the Dublin law firm that has represented and still represents Bosphorus, New York, N.Y. (Feb. 6,
1997). Mr. Doyle believes that the Turkish law requiring airlines to have at least two

aircraft in operation in order to carry on its business is in fact a regulation of the Turkish Civil Aviation Authority. Id.
445. Bosphorus High Court 1996 Decision, supra note 416, at *9.
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parking fees." 6 Bosphorus had no other aircraft and was, thus,
put out of business as an airline." 7 In addition, Bosphorus paid
for the costs of the aircrafts' insurance, the maintenance performed by Team Aer Lingus on the first aircraft, and the detention of the second aircraft in Istanbul with money from the JAT
blocked account." The result of these payments was that as of
January 22, 1996, there were virtually no funds remaining in that
account." 9
B. Proceedings Priorto the ECJ
Bosphorus filed a suit in the Irish High Court in Dublin
seeking judicial review of the Minister for Transport, Energy and
Communications' direction to impound the aircraft. 450 In its
judgment, the Irish High Court held that the Minister did not
have authority to impound Bosphorus' aircraft because Regulation 990/93 did not cover the aircraft.4 5 ' Upon the Minister's
appeal of the High Court's judgment, the Irish Supreme Court
asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling as to whether Regulation
452
990/93 applied to Bosphorus' aircraft.
1. The Irish High Court Judgment
In its judgment of June 21, 1994, the Irish High Court
found that the Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications lacked authority to impound Bosphorus' aircraft. 455 The
High Court justified its holding by arguing that Regulation 990/
93 did not apply to the aircraft in question because Bosphorus,
which was not a Yugoslavian person or undertaking, held the majority or controlling interest in the aircraft.4M In its judgment,
the High Court focused on how it should interpret Regulation
446. Id. The Irish High Court's 1996 decision in Bosphorus is dated January 22,
1996. Id. at *1.
447. Id. at *9.

448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3964-65,
28, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 279.
451. Bosphorus, [19941 2 I.L.R.M. at 560, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 472.
452. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3984, 1 16, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 261-62.
453. Bosphorus, [19941 2 I.L.R.M. at 560, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 472.
454. Id.
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990/93 and the U.N. resolutions referred to therein.4 "5
In considering the interpretational issue, the Irish High
Court applied the teleological approach to interpretation, 456 according to which judges interpret regulations by seeking to identify the purpose or end that legislators or administrators intended the regulations to achieve.4 5 7 The High Court concluded that the purpose of the embargo regulations was to deter
Yugoslavia from acting or continuing to act in ways that would
lead to more deaths and material damage and also to punish,
deter, and sanction the people and leaders of Yugoslavia.4 5 The
High Court further concluded that the intention behind the regulations was not to punish or penalize people or countries who
have neither caused nor contributed to the tragic events in Yugoslavia.45 9 Acknowledging that innocent parties are sometimes
unavoidably harmed by sanction regulations, the High Court
stated that such harm would be justified only if the harm necessarily accompanied the sanction and was not disproportionate to
the sanction that the European Community sought to impose on
guilty parties." ° The High Court specifically argued that the
purpose of Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 was to deprive guilty
parties of recourse to aircraft or vehicles that one could use to
transport goods in violation of the embargo."'
In its discussion of Article 8 of Regulation 990/93, the High
Court concentrated on the meaning of the term interest. 462 The
High Court argued that it should not construe the use of the
phrase majority or controlling interest in Article 8 solely in terms
of percentages, but rather with regard also to the nature of the
interest held by a party in question.4 63 In particular, the High
455. See id. at 558-60, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 470-72 (interpreting Regulation 990/
93, in particular Article 8, and U.N. resolutions to which it refers).

456. See id. (basing interpretation of Regulation 990/93 and U.N. embargo resolutions on purpose behind their enactment).
457. See WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 56, at 92 (stating that teleological

method involves interpreting texts by concentrating on purpose that Community attempted to achieve by passing measure); see supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing teleological approach to interpretation).
458. Bosphorns, [1994] 2 I.L.R.M. at 558, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 470.
459. Id.

460. Id.
461. Id. at 559, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 471.
462. See Bosphonw, [1994] I.L.R.M. at 559-60, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 471-72 (interpreting term "interest" under Article 8).
463. See id. at 559, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 471 (pointing out potential injustice of
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Court noted that Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 specifies the
degree of interest 4s that a Yugoslavian entity must have in an
aircraft in order for the aircraft to be subject to impounding, but
not the nature of the interest. 4 5 The High Court then concluded that the interest contemplated in Article 8 must have
been an interest in possession or the right to enjoy, control, or
regulate the property's use, rather than the right to income derived from the property. 46 1 The High Court justified this interpretation as consistent with the intention expressed in Article 8
to cover situations where a Yugoslavian entity could exercise decision-making functions concerning the property's use on a daily
basis.467
Under this interpretation, as long as no Yugoslavian entity
had use of or control over an aircraft, or the opportunity to obtain income derived from it, then the Regulation would not
cover the aircraft, and the aircraft's impounding would be unjustified." 8 Applying its interpretation of interest, the High Court
construction of phrase "majority or controlling interest" based solely on percentages,
without regard to nature of interest held).
464. See Council Regulation No. 990/93, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. L 102/14, at 16
(1993) (referring to "aircraft in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a"
Yugoslav entity).
465. Bosphorus, [1994] I.L.R.M. at 559, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 471. To illustrate the
potential implications of conceiving of the interest under Article 8 as one of "absolute
ownership and the immediate right to possession," the High Court pointed out that if
such an interest "was shared between a Yugoslav national and a Turkish national as to
45% for the Yugoslav and 55% for the Turkish citizen that notwithstanding the very
substantial involvement of the Yugoslav national, [Article 8] would have no application." Id. On the other hand, applying the same concept of the nature of the requisite
interest:
[W] here an aircraft (or freight vehicle or rolling stock) is the subject matter of
a lease perhaps for a long period of years granted in consideration of a very
substantial payment and a nominal annual rent by a Yugoslav citizen to a citizen of [an EC Member State], that aircraft would be captured by the article
with the result that the [Member State citizen] would be gravely prejudiced
with virtually no detriment to the lessor's absolute but nominal right in reversion.
Id.
466. Id. at 559, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 471-72. "[T]he 'interest' referred to in Article
8 is essentially the interest in possession or the right to enjoy control or regulate the use
of the asset rather than an income derived from it." Id.
467. Id. at 559, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 471. "[T]he degree or extent of the interest
referred to in [Article 8] must have been intended to identify a situation in which the
person in or operating from Yugoslavia could exercise a decision-making function in
relation to the use on a day to day basis of the asset in question." Id.
468. Id. at 560, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 472.
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found that only Bosphorus held the majority and controlling interest in the aircraft in question. 46 9 The High Court held accordingly that Regulation 990/93 had not empowered the Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications to impound Bosphorus' aircraft.4 7 °
After the High Court decision, the Minister for Transport,
Energy and Communications detained the aircraft under Article
9 of Regulation 990/93 pending his investigation into the issue
of whether the provision of maintenance services and insurance
to the aircraft constituted non-financial services for purposes of
any business conducted in Yugoslavia under Article 1.1(e) of
that Regulation. 471 Bosphorus applied to the High Court for relief from this detention, and the High Court ordered the aircraft
returned to Bosphorus. 471 The High Court, describing Bosphorus as an innocent party, held that the Minister had not investigated the Article 1.1 (e) issue within a reasonable time of the aircraft's detention and had failed to exercise proper regard for the
rights of Bosphorus in his determination of the propriety of de4 73
tention or forfeiture under the EC embargo regulations.
2. Irish Supreme Court
The Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications
appealed the High Court's order to the Irish Supreme Court.4 7 4
The Irish Supreme Court concluded that the determination of
the issues in the case depended on the correct interpretation of
Article 8 of Regulation 990/93. 47 ' The Irish Supreme Court
469. Bosphors, [1994] I.L.R.M. at 560, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 472. The Irish High
Court wrote:
The duty [that Article 8] imposed on the responsible authority was to act if
and only if a particular state of affairs existed, namely, where a majority or
controlling interest in an aircraft was held by an undertaking in or operating
from the Federal Republic [of Yugoslavia], and in my view that is not the position in the present. In my opinion, the majority and controlling interest in
the aircraft in question is and was held by Bosphorus Airways and by no other
person.
Id.
470. Id.
471. Bosphorus High Court 1996 Decision, supra note 416, at *11.
472. Id. at *25.
473. Id.
474. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3981, 6, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 292.
475. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphors, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3965, 1 29,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 279.
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therefore referred to the ECJ the question of whether Article 8
applied to an aircraft such as the one that Bosphorus leased.4 7 6
C. The ECJ
In the Bosphorus decision, the ECJ found that Regulation
990/93 did apply to the aircraft that JAT had leased to Bosphorus.477 Advocate GeneralJacobs' Opinion argued in favor of this
conclusion and treated the issues of interpretation, infringement
478 The ECJ
of fundamental property rights, and proportionality.
came to the same conclusion as Advocate General Jacobs,
stressing EC interests as justifications for the restriction of a
property right and the importance of the objective of Regulation
990/93, which the ECJ interpreted to be the ending of the war
in Bosnia.4 7 9

1. Advocate General Jacobs' Opinion
Advocate General Jacobs supported the conclusion that
Regulation 990/93 applied to the Bosphorus aircraft, 8 ' and that
the decision to impound the aircraft did not violate Bosphorus'
fundamental right to property. 8 1 Concerning the issue of the

Regulation's application to the aircraft, he stated that because
the Regulation's preamble clarifies that the Council intended

the Regulation to implement Resolutions 713, 757, 787, and 820,
there was no doubt that the Regulation had to be interpreted in
light of the Resolutions. 4 8 2 To Advocate General Jacobs, the real
476. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3981, 6, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 292. In the question that the Supreme Court of Ireland referred to the ECJ, the Supreme Court asked:
Is Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 to be construed as applying to an aircraft
which is owned by an undertaking the majority or controlling interest in which
is held by an undertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) where such aircraft has been leased by the owner for a term of
four years from 22nd April 1992 to an undertaking the majority or controlling
interest in which is not held by a person or undertaking in or operating from
the said Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)?
Id.
477. See id. at 1-3982, 8, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 292-93 (summarizing Bosphorus'
argument that Regulation 990/93 did not apply to Bosphorus' aircraft).
478. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3970, 13977, 1 47, 69, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 285, 291.
479. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3987, 26, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 295-96.
480. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3970, 1
46-47, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 284-85.
481. Id. at 1-3976, 1 67, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 290.
482. Id. at 1-3966-67, 35, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 281.
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issue was not the EC intention in enacting the Regulation, but
rather the Security Council's purpose in passing the underlying
Resolutions. 5
After quoting the Irish High Court judgment at length,4 8 4
Advocate General Jacobs disagreed with what he characterized as
that court's narrow construction of Resolution 820 with respect
to its purpose.4"8 5 Advocate General Jacobs argued that one
could construe the Security Council's goal in passing Resolution
820 as to deprive Yugoslavian entities of any benefit they could
derive from the fact that a party was continuing to operate,
maintain, and insure a means of transport that these entities
owned, rather than the mere strengthening of the trade embargo by depriving these entities of recourse to aircrafts they
could use to violate the embargo.4 86 According to Advocate
General Jacobs, such a construction would view the impounding

provision in Resolution 820 as extending Resolution 757's provisions for the freezing of Yugoslavian assets abroad to possessions
presenting no immediate risk of being used to circumvent the
trade embargo. *s
483. Id. at 1-3968-69,
40, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 283. Advocate General Jacobs
wrote:
What is in issue is not the intention of the Community institutions themselves,
which can often be gathered from the context and preamble and possible also
from the submissions made by those institutions before the court, but the purpose of the Security Council, an organ composed of many diverse states acting
in highly charged political circumstances. A literal interpretation of the text
may therefore carry more weight.
Id.
484. Id. at 1-3967-68, [ 37-38, (1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 281-82.
485. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphorus, (1996] E.C.R. at 1-3968, 39,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 282-83.
486. Id. Advocate General Jacobs wrote that the object of the Security Council's
decision "to impound means of transport in which undertakings in [Yugoslavia] have a
majority or controlling interest.. may be to deprive the Yugoslav undertaking in a case
such as the present one of even the indirect benefit of the fact that a means of transport
will continue to operate and continue to be maintained and insured." Id.
487. Id. Advocate General Jacobs wrote:
It will be remembered that the Security Council [in Resolution 757] also decided to freeze all funds belonging to or destined for authorities or undertakings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The decision to impound means of transport in which undertakings in that Republic
have a majority or controlling interest can be construed as a further decision
freezing assets abroad, even where there is no immediate risk of their being
used to circumvent the trade embargo.
Id. at 1-3968, 39, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 282.
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In support of his interpretation, Advocate General Jacobs
cited the EC Commission's position that the Security Council's
aim included preventing Yugoslavian persons and undertakings
from being able to recover means of transport temporarily
outside their control.4 8' The Commission had supported this
stance by pointing out that sanctions are never entirely effective.48 9 It had thus supported the authorization of the earliest
possible actions rather than simply hoping that no party coming
into possession of the property would pass control of it to Yugoslavian entities or persons.490 The Advocate General stated that
he found this argument to be particularly forceful as it applied
to aircrafts because so long as an aircraft is airborne, it can
change course and return to Yugoslavia.49 ' The Advocate General further argued that when a situation involved a mere lease,
there was always the risk that one or all of the parties to the lease
might terminate the lease before the end of its full term with the
aircraft, thus, returning to the owner.492 Advocate General Jacobs then claimed that this last argument would have justified
the impounding even if the ECJ were to accept the Irish High
Court's narrow interpretation of paragraph 24 of Resolution
820. 4 9 3

In further support of his interpretation of Resolutions 713,
757, 787, and 820, Advocate General Jacobs turned to their language.494 He first pointed out that both the resolutions and the
Regulation employed the phrase majority or controlling interest.4 95 Advocate General Jacobs also argued against the notion
that the term interest referred to an aircraft's country of registration, which in Bosphorus' case was Turkey.4 9 6 Advocate General
Jacobs pointed out that Resolution 757 referred specifically to
488. Id. at 1-3969, 41, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 283.
489. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3969, 1 41,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 283.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 1-3969, 1 42, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 283. "[A]s long as an aircraft is airborne there will always be the risk of an unexpected change of course, in this case back
to [Yugoslavia]; depending on its location at the time, the risk may be far greater in the
case of an aircraft than in the case of a ship." Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bosphor, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3969, 1 43,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 283-84.
495. Id.
496. Id.
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aircrafts registered in Yugoslavia while Resolution 820 did not
49 7
use the term register at all.
The Advocate General then proceeded to evaluate Bosphorus' argument that the impounding had violated both its fundamental right to property and the principle of proportionality.4 9 8
After setting forth various sources of fundamental rights in the
European Community, 499 he cited Hauer500 as establishing the
rule that the principle of proportionality forms an essential aspect of the test for determining whether there has been a property rights violation. 5 1 Advocate General Jacobs thus saw the essential question concerning the property rights issue to be
whether the impounding was proportionate in light of the Regulation's aims concerning the general interest.5 °
Advocate General Jacobs began his proportionality and
property rights analysis by conceding that the impounding constituted a severe restriction of Bosphorus' rights that amounted
to a temporary deprivation. 0 5 Advocate General Jacobs then
proceeded to stress the greatness of the public interest in enforcing the U.N. embargo, characterizing that interest as the ending
of the war in Bosnia. 0 4 Advocate General Jacobs also observed
497. Id.
498. Id. at 1-3971, 1 49, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 285.
499. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-397175, 1 51-61, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 285-89 (discussing Article F(2) of TEU, Article 1 of
Protocol I to European Human Rights Convention, and CHR and ECJ property rights
case law).
500. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3749, 30, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 68; see supra notes
274-96 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's holding in Hauer that EC regulation
temporarily forbidding planting of vines was not disproportionate and, thus, did not
infringe right to property).
501. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3974-75,
It 61-62, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 288-89.
502. Id. at 1-3975, 1 62, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 289. "Indeed, the essential question
is whether the obvious interference with Bosphorus Airways' possession of the aircraft is
a proportionate measure in the light of the aims of general interest which the Regulation seeks to achieve." Id.
503. Id. at 1-3975, 1 63, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 289.
504. Id. at 1-3975-76,
64, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 289. Advocate General Jacobs
wrote:
On the other hand it is also obvious that there is a particularly strong public
interest in enforcing embargo measures decided by the United Nations Security Council. Indeed it is difficult to think of any stronger type of public interest than that of stopping a war as devastating as that which engulfed the former Yugoslavia, and in particular Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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that Bosphorus was not alone in suffering economic loss from
the imposition and enforcement of the embargo.50 5 He concluded that the impounding was not unreasonable because, applying the European Court of Human Rights' test in Sporrong,506
it did not strike an unfair balance between the general interest's
demands and requirements
of the protection of the fundamen50 7
tal right to property.
Throughout his treatment of the proportionality and property rights issue, Advocate General Jacobs focused on the importance of the public interest involved. 08 Advocate General Jacobs
argued that the severity of the financial and commercial impact
that the impounding had on Bosphorus' particular business was
irrelevant to the issue of whether the impounding was proportionate. 5 9 Advocate General Jacobs further stated that even if
the impact were relevant, the public interest was so important
that the impounding of Bosphorus' aircraft still would not have
infringed the proportionality principle. 10 Similarly, he argued
that even if one considered the proportionality issue independently of the property rights issue, the extreme importance of
the general interest served would require the same conclusion.51
505. Id.
506. See Sporong, 5 E.H.R.R. at 52-53, 69 (stating that in order to determine
whether there has been violation of applicant's right to peaceful enjoyment of property,
it is necessary to determine whether "fair balance was struck between the demands of
the general interest . . . and the requirements of the protection of the individual's
fundamental rights."); see supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text (discussing CHR's
application in Sporrong of fair balance test as method for determining whether Stockholm expropriation permits had violated property rights).
507. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3976,
65, 67, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 289-90. Advocate General Jacobs was of the opinion, "the
decision to impound the aircraft on the ground that it was owned by an undertaking in
[Yugoslavia] cannot be regarded as unreasonable either at the moment when it was
taken or subsequently, even though the aircraft was not actually controlled by such an
undertaking at the time of the impounding." Id. at 1-3976, 65, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R at
290.
508. See id. at 1-3975-77, [ 64-69, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 289-91 (commenting on
importance of public interest Regulation 990/93 served).
509. Id. at 1-3976, 66, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 290.
510. Id. Advocate General argued, "[b]ut even if it were relevant to take account
of the losses of the losses allegedly incurred by Bosphorus Airways, I do not think that
the principle of proportionality would be infringed, in view of the importance of the
public interest involved." Id.
511. Id. at 1-3977, 69, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 291.

1074

FORDHAM1NTERAATIONALLAWJOURAAL

[Vol. 20:1007

2. The ECJ Decision
The Supreme Court of Ireland referred a question to the
ECJ, asking whether Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 applied to
an aircraft whose owner, in which a Yugoslavian business holds
the majority or controlling interest, has leased it for four years to
a business in which no Yugoslavian entity holds the majority or
controlling interest. 512 In answering the question in the affirmative, the ECJ considered issues concerning the interpretation of
the Regulation. 513 The ECJ also considered the fundamental
right to property and the principle of proportionality in reaching its conclusion. 1 4
a. The ECJ's Interpretation of Regulation 990/93
The ECJ held that Regulation 990/93 applied to an aircraft
whose owner, a Yugoslavian business that holds the majority or
controlling interest, leased it for four years to a business in which
no Yugoslavian entity holds the majority or controlling interest. 51 5 Bosphorus had argued that Regulation 990/93 did not
apply to a Yugoslavian-owned aircraft operated on a daily basis by
a non-Yugoslavian undertaking under a lease, because the sanctions of Regulation 990/93 were only meant to extend to Yugoslavia and its nationals, rather than also to innocent parties operating from a state neighboring the European Community and
5 16
with which the European Community had friendly relations.
The ECJ did not accept this argument. 5 17 The ECJ, citing the
rule that it is necessary in interpreting a provision of Community
law to consider its language, context, and purposes,5 18 countered
that the language of Article 8 did not distinguish between ownership of an aircraft and its day-to-day control and operation. 5 19
512. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3981,
6, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 292.
513. See id. at 1-3982, 1 8-9, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 292-93 (summarizing Bosphorus'

argument that Regulation did not apply to its aircraft).
514. See id. at 1-3985,
19-20, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 294-95 (summarizing Bosphorus' argument that Regulation, if found to apply to its aircraft, would infringe its right
to property and principle of proportionality).
515. Id. at 1-3987, 27, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 296.
516. Id. at 1-3982, 1 9, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293.
517. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3982,
10, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293.
518. Id. at 1-3983, 11, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293. The ECJ stated, "[iun interpret-

ing a provision of Community law it is necessary to consider its wording, its context and
its aims." Id.

519. Id. at 1-3983, 1 12, [1996] 3 C.M.LR. at 293. The EqJ wrote, "[n]othing in
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The ECJ further pointed out that the Regulation's language nowhere exempted a Yugoslavian-owned aircraft whose
owner did
52 0
not have continuous operation and control of it.

Concerning the Regulation's context and aims, the ECJ first
noted that by passing Regulation 990/93 the Council was giving
effect to the EC desire to have recourse to an instrument to implement certain aspects of the U.N. resolutions' sanctions
against Yugoslavia.52 1 The ECJ then argued that it must consider
the text and purpose of those resolutions, especially of Resolution 820, whose use of the term interest could not exclude ownership as a criterion for determining whether or not to impound.5 2 2 The ECJ reinforced this last point by claiming that

the word majority, which Paragraph 24 of Resolution 820 used in
conjunction with the term interest, unambiguously implies the
idea of ownership and by observing that most of the language
versions of Article 8 employ words having explicit connotations
of ownership.5 2 Finally, the ECJ argued that interpreting the
Regulation so as not to uphold the impounding of Yugoslavianowned aircraft that a non-Yugoslavian entity controlled on a dayto-day basis would result in less pressure on Yugoslavia and
would in general jeopardize the effectiveness of the intended
strengthening of the sanctions.52 4
the wording of the first paragraph of Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 suggests that it is
based on a distinction between ownership of an aircraft on the one hand and its day-today operation and control on the other." Id.
520. Id. "Nor is it anywhere stated in [Article 8] that it is not applicable to an
aircraft owned by a person or undertaking based in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia if that person or undertaking does not have day-to-day control and
operation of the aircraft." Id.
521. Id. at 1-3983, 13, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293. The ECJ stated:
As to context and aims, it should be noted that by Regulation 990/93 the
Council gave effect to the decision of the Community and its Member States
... to have recourse to a Community instrument to implement in the Community certain aspects of the sanctions taken against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the Security Council of the United Nations, which ... adopted
Resolutions 713 (1991), 752 (1992) and 787 (1992) and strengthened those
sanctions by Resolution 820 (1993).
Id.
522. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3984, 15, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293-94. "The
word 'interest' in Paragraph 24 [of Resolution 820] cannot, on any view, exclude ownership as a determining criterion for impounding." Id.
523. Id. at 1-3984, 1 15-16, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293-94.
524. Id. at 1-3984-85,
17-18, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 294. The ECJ argued that the
impounding of aircraft that a Yugoslav entity owns and of which an entity like Bosphorus has day-to-day control "contributes to restricting the exercise by the Federal Repub-
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b. The ECJ's Property Rights and Proportionality Analysis
The ECJ then turned to Bosphorus' argument that interpreting Article 8 as covering its impounded aircraft would infringe its fundamental right to peaceful enjoyment of its property and the principle of proportionality.5 2 5 The ECJ first stated
the rule that the right to property as recognized in the ECJ's case
law is not absolute and that the European Community may restrict the exercise of that right in accordance with goals of general interest that the European Community pursues.52 6 In support of these propositions, the ECJ cited Hauer and Wachauf5 27
The ECJ then noted that all sanction measures have, by their
nature, negative effects on the right to property of parties not
responsible for the conditions that brought about the sanctions'
adoption and that the aims of Regulation 990/93 were sufficiently important to justify even significant negative consequences for some parties.52 8
The ECJ recited some of the observations found in the preamble of Regulation 990/93 concerning the situation in Bosnia,
lic of Yugoslavia and its nationals of their property rights and is thus consistent with the
aim of the sanctions, namely to put pressure on that republic." Id. at 1-3984, 1 17,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 294. The ECJ continued:
By contrast, the use of day-to-day operation and control, rather than ownership, as the decisive criterion for applying the measures prescribed by the first
paragraph of Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 would jeopardise the effectiveness of the strengthening of the sanctions, which consist in impounding all
means of transport of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its nationals,
including aircraft, in order to further to increase the pressure on that Republic. The mere transfer of day-to-day operation and control of means of transport, by a lease or other method, without transferring ownership would allow
that Republic or its nationals to evade application of those sanctions.
Id.
525. Id. at 1-3985, 1 19-20, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 294-95.
526. Id. at 1-3985, 21, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 295. "It is settled case law that the
fundamental rights invoked by Bosphorus Airways are not absolute and their exercise
may be subject to restrictions justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the
Community [citations omitted]." Id.
527. See Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3985, 21, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 295 (citing
Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3749, 1 30, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 68, and Wachauf, [1989] E.C.R.
at 2640, 1 22, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 349-50). In Hauer, the ECJ held that an EC Council
Regulation temporarily prohibiting the planting vines did not violate property rights.
Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3749, 30, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 68. In Wachauf the ECJ held
that two EC regulations providing for compensation to dairy farmers who ceased milk
production permanently did not conflict with fundamental rights that the EC protected. Wachauf, [1989] E.C.R. at 2640, 22, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 349-50.
528. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3986, 11 22-23, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 295.

19971

1077

THE BOSPHORUS CASE

Yugoslavia's actions in relation to that situation, and the sanctions' goal of inducing Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs to cease
their war-like activities and work toward peace there.52 9 The ECJ
then concluded that the impounding of the aircraft was not disproportionate in comparison to the Regulation's purpose.530
The ECJ based this conclusion on the fact that the Regulation's
purpose, which was to bring about an end to the war in Bosnia
and the numerous human rights violations and transgressions
against humanitarian international law, concerned a53fundamental general interest of the international community. '
III. IN FINDING REGULATION 990/93 TO APPLY TO
BOSPHORUS' AIRCRAFI, THE ECJ MISINTERPRETED
THE REGULATION AND VIOLATED
BOSPHORUS' PROPERTY RIGHT
The ECJ should refrain from following its Bosphorus decision
in the future in order to preserve property rights as an important
representation of states' recognition that governmental interference in individuals' lives requires a legitimate justification. The
impounding of Bosphorus' aircraft was disproportionate to the
concrete EC objective in passing Regulation 990/93 and did not
represent the least intrusive means for the attainment of that objective. In addition, it was not clear from the wording of Article
8 of Regulation 990/93 that the operative phrase majority and
controlling interest covers a Yugoslavian-owned aircraft that a
529. Id. at 1-3986-87,

24-25, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 295. The ECJ pointed specifi-

cally to the observations in the preamble to Regulation 990/93 that Serbia and Montenegro's extended direct and indirect activities in and concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina
were the major cause of the problems there, and that the continuation of those activities would bring about additional deaths and property damage and further disrupt international peace and security in that region. Id. The ECJ also cited the Council's
claim in Regulation 990/93 that the Bosnian Serb party had not yet accepted the Inter-

national Conference on Yugoslavia's peace plan in full. Id. at 1-3986,

1 24, [1996] 3

C.M.L.R. at 295.
530. Id. at 1-3987, 26, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 295-96.
531. Id. The Eq wrote:

As compared with an objective of general interest so fundamental for the international community, which consists in putting an end to the state of war in

the region and to the massive violations of human rights and humanitarian
law in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the impounding of the aircraft in
question, which is owned by an undertaking based in or operating from the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cannot be regarded as inappropriate or disproportionate.
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non-Yugoslavian business has leased.53 2
A. The Impounding of Bosphorus' Aircraft Pursuant to Regulation
990/93 Violated Bosphorus'PropertyRight Because it was
not Proportionateto the Regulation's Concretely
Conceived Purpose
Proportionality is one of the general principles at work in
Community law and, therefore, the ECJ should not adhere to
decisions that violate the principle of proportionality. 3 3 The impounding of Bosphorus' aircraft pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 was not reasonably related to the Regulation's goal
of ensuring that Yugoslavian parties do not have access to aircrafts so as to violate the embargo against Yugoslavia. 3 4 Furthermore, the impounding was disproportionate to the Regulation's
goal because less intrusive means existed for achieving this goal.
1. A Reasonable Relationship did not Exist between the
Impounding and the Aim of Regulation 990/93 as
Concretely Conceived
Properly defining the aim of Regulation 990/93 as the prevention of Yugoslavia and any Yugoslavian entities participating
in the war from having recourse to their aircraft for the violation
of the embargo, 5 5 rather than as the ending of the war,56 would
result in a conclusion that the impounding of Bosphorus' aircraft was disproportionate and, thus, violated Bosphorus' property right. In Bosphorus, the ECJ employed the contextual and
teleological methods of interpretation,5 3 7 according to which the
ECJ interprets Community acts by examining their place within
the context of their passage and the aims the Community sought
532. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3968,

It 38-39, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 282-83 (quoting and then explaining basis for his disagreement with Irish High Court's interpretation of meaning of "interest" in Article 8 of
Regulation 990/93).
533. WYAr & DASHWOOD, supra note 56, at 60; see supra notes 105-10 (discussing
ECJ's application of principle of proportionality).
534. See Bosphorus, [1994] 2 I.L.R.M. at 559, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 471 (finding
purpose of Regulation 990/93 to be to deprive guilty parties in Yugoslavia of recourse
to aircrafts that they could use to violate embargo).
535. Id.
536. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3987, 1 26, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 295.
537. See id. at 1-3983-85, 1 11-18, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293-94 (applying contextual and teleological methods of interpretation to Regulation 990/93).
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to achieve by their passage. 3 In general, the more abstract the
conception of the aim of the EC embargo measures, and in particular the aim of Regulation 990/93, the more difficult it is to
argue that an impounding was disproportionate to the Regulation's aims because an abstractly conceived aim could plausibly
be shown to cover more cases and situations than a more concretely conceived aim. The ECJ found the impounding of Bosphorus' aircraft to be proportionate based on its framing of the
aim of Regulation 990/93 in such abstract terms539 that one
could find virtually any measure to be reasonably related to that
aim. The ending of a war is an aim so abstract that the question
of what types of measures would not be reasonably likely to further it is so amorphous as to be virtually meaningless.
The text of Regulation 990/93 does not clearly indicate the
EC goal in passing that Regulation.54 In the Preamble to Regulation 990/93, the European Community makes a number of observations concerning the war in Bosnia.54 The Preamble states
that Serbia and Montenegro's extended direct and indirect activities in and concerning Bosnia were the major cause of the violence there and that the continuation of those activities would
bring about additional deaths and property damage and further
disrupt international peace and security in the region of the former Yugoslavia.52 The European Community also observed in
Regulation 990/93 that the Bosnian Serb party had not yet fully
accepted the International Conference on Yugoslavia's peace
plan, that further violation of the existing embargo on Yugoslavia had to be prevented, and that the U.N. Security Council had
adopted Resolution 820 for the purpose of strengthening the
embargo of Yugoslavia that Resolutions 713, 757, and 787 estab538. See supranotes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing contextual and teleological approaches to interpretation).
539. See Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3986-87, 1 24-26, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R at 29596 (characterizing aim of Regulation 990/93 as ending war in Yugoslavia and its attendant human rights violations).
540. See supra notes 397-401 and accompanying text (discussing language of Regulation 990/93 regarding its purpose).
541. Council Regulation No. 990/93, supra note 11, pmbl., O.J. L 102/14, at 14
(1993) (presenting observations on conflict in Bosnia); see supra notes 397-401 and accompanying text (discussing language of preamble to Regulation 990/93 concerning
Regulation's purpose).
542. Council Regulation No. 990/93, supra note 11, pmbl., OJ. L 102/14, at 14
(1993).
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lished.143 In addition, Regulation 990/93 noted that the European Community and its Member States had previously decided
that action was necessary to dissuade Serbia and Montenegro
from further violating the integrity and security of Bosnia and to
secure the Bosnian Serbs' cooperation in achieving peace in Bosnia."' Finally, Regulation 990/93 stated that the European
Community and its Member States had agreed to avail themselves, if necessary, of an EC measure so as to ensure consistent
implementation of particular U.N. resolutions and EC regulations.5 4 5 The European Community thus expressed the aim of
Regulation 990/93 in varying degrees of abstraction without indicating exactly what it hoped to achieve with this measure.
The abstract language concerning the EC desire to bring
about peace makes more sense when viewed as describing that
which the Community hoped would eventually occur as a result
of an implementation of the Regulation's concrete and specific
provisions, such as Article 8. In its decision, the ECJ considered
the relationship between the impounding of a leased aircraft
and the purpose which it broadly found to be behind Regulation
990/93.546 The ECJ described the aim of Regulation 990/93 as
543. Id. Council Regulation 990/93 noted:
[F] urther violations of the existing embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in particular by their transit through this Republic and by activities carried out between this Republic and the Serb- controlled areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the United Nations Protected Areas
in the Republic of Croatia have to be prevented; [and that] the United Nations Security Council .

.

. has adopted Resolution 820 (1993), in order to

strengthen the embargo of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), decided upon in Resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992) and 787

(1992); [and that] under these conditions, the Community has to strengthen
the embargo of [Yugoslavia] as established by Council Regulations (EEC) No
1432/92 and (EEC) No 2656/92 ....

Id.
544. Id. The Council stated that the European Community and the Member
States had decided "that measures [had] to be taken to dissuade the Republics of Serbia

and Montenegro from further violating the integrity and security of the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and to induce the Bosnian Serb party to cooperate in the restoration of peace in this Republic .... " Id.
545. Id. Regulation 990/93 did not specify which resolutions or regulations it was
referring to, vaguely stating that the European Community and its Member States "have
agreed to have recourse to a Community instrument, inter alia, in order to ensure a

uniform implementation throughout the Community of certain of these measures." Id.
546. See Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3985-87, 11 20-26, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 29496 (applying proportionality analysis to impounding of Bosphorus' aircraft under Regulation 990/93).
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the ending of the war in Bosnia and the war's attendant human
rights violations and the restoration of humanitarian international law. 47 There is, however, a legitimate alternative to the
ECJ's understanding of the aim of Regulation 990/93. In considering the question of the purpose of the U.N. Security Council resolutions, the Irish High Court concluded that the intention behind the sanctions was to deter, punish, or sanction the
Yugoslavian people or Government.S The Irish High Court interpreted the purpose of Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 as being
to deprive guilty parties in Yugoslavia of recourse to aircrafts that
they could use to breach the embargo. 49
The aim of Regulation 990/93 is more accurately described
in terms of the concrete effects it would have if it were enforced
successfully. Among the many such effects that the Council must
have intended the Regulation to have was to ensure that Yugoslavia and any Yugoslavian participants in the war could not have
recourse to any of their aircraft for use in the violation of the
embargo.5 5 0 This particular aim was the domain of Article 8 of
the Regulation. 5
There was no reasonable relationship between the impounding of Bosphorus' aircraft and the Regulation's aim when
the latter is concretely conceived as the prevention of Yugoslavia
and Yugoslavian entities' obtaining aircraft for use in circumventing the embargo. Accordingly, the Bosphorus decision violates the principle of proportionality in Community law, which
requires that there be a reasonable relationship between a mea547. Id. at 1-3987, 26, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 295-96.
548. Bosphons, [1994] I.L.R.M. at 558, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 470. The Irish High

Court wrote:
The express purpose of the [sanctions] imposed by the regulations is to deter
the Federal Republic [of Yugoslavia] from engaging in or continuing with activities which will lead to further unacceptable loss of human life and material
damage. It is clear, beyond debate, that these regulations are intended to operate as a punishment, deterrent or sanction against the people or government of that troubled republic.
Id.
549. Id. at 559, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 471.
550. Id.
551. See Council Regulation 990/93, supra note 11, art. 8, OJ. L 102/14, at 16
(1993) (providing for impounding of aircrafts in which Yugoslavian entity holds major-

ity or controlling interest). Article 8 stated, "[a]ll vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock
and aircraft in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
shall be impounded by the competent authorities of the Member States." Id.
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sure that a regulation provides for and the aim the European
Community is pursuing by means of the regulation.5 5 2 Bosphorus neither was based in nor operated from Yugoslavia, and no
person or business based in or operating from Yugoslavia had
any interest in it.555 Bosphorus was using the aircraft exclusively
for the running of tour operations in countries that did not include Yugoslavia, and, therefore, Bosphorus's use of the aircraft
in no way threatened to provide any Yugoslavian persons or
groups with access to aircrafts in violation of the Regulation's
goal of preventing circumvention of the embargo.5 5 4 Finally, the
absence of evidence in the opinions and decisions in the Bosphorus case of any connection between Bosphorus shareholders or
employees and Yugoslavian governmental or military officials
shows the absence of a connection between Bosphorus' actions
and the goal of preventing circumvention of the embargo by denying Yugoslavia access to aircrafts.
The ECJ's holding that the impounding of Bosphorus' aircraft was proportionate is in conflict with other CHR and ECJ
property rights cases. In Sporrong,5 55 the CHR held that the City
of Stockholm's expropriation permits and prohibitions on construction which covered the applicants' properties violated the
applicants' right to property that Article 1 of Protocol I to the
European Human Rights Convention guaranteed. 55 6 The CHR
552. InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft mbH, [1970] E.C.R. at 1135,
16, [1972]
C.M.L.R. at 285; Bermann, supra note 105, at 386; see supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing principle of proportionality in Community law). The ECJ has
held that a Council regulation conditioning the issue of an export and import license
upon a payment of deposit did not violate the principle of proportionality. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH, [1970] E.C.R. at 1135,
16, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 285. The
ECJ reasoned that the costs that the deposit involved were not disproportionate to the
total value of goods and trading costs in question. Id. The ECJ also concluded that the
burdens that the system of deposits caused were not excessive and were a normal consequence of a system of organization whose aim was to ensure both an adequate standard
of living for farmers and reasonable prices for consumers. Id.
553. See supra notes 415-16, 429-30 and accompanying text (discussing incorporation in Turkey and Turk citizens' ownership of impounded aircraft in Bosphorus).
554. Bosphons, [1994] 2 I.L.R.M. at 555, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 467; see supra notes
418-28 and accompanying text (discussing facts concerning Bosphorus' use of leased
aircraft in Bosphorus).
555. Sporrong v. Sweden, 5 E.H.R.R. 35 (1983).
556. Sporrong, 1 74, 5 E.H.R.R. at 54; see supra notes 202-31 and accompanying text
(discussing CHR's holding in Sporrong that Stockholm expropriation permits and
prohibitions on construction violated applicants' right to property because they did not
strike requisite balance between community interests and right to property).
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argued that the permits and prohibitions had failed to strike a
fair balance between the City's interests and the applicants' right
to property because Swedish law had provided neither for the
applicants' compensation nor for the possibility of reassessing
the applicants' and the City's respective interests
at intervals dur5 57
ing the periods the measures were in effect.
Applying the reasoning in Sporrong to the Bosphorus case,
Regulation 990/93 should have provided for possible compensation for parties whose aircrafts authorities had impounded or for
assessments of such parties' and the EC respective interests concerning an impounded aircraft. This especially regards parties
like Bosphorus for whom the impounding wreaked economic

havoc. 5 The CHR's holding in Air Canada"9 is not inconsistent with its holding in Sporrong because Air Canada's £50,000
fine was quite small, considering the company's size and the
value of the aircraft, 6 ° and U.K. authorities only held Air Canada's aircraft for less than a day.5 61 Accordingly, the ECJ's Bosphorus decision conflicts with the CHR's jurisprudence, a result
that the ECJ has consistently and properly sought to avoid in the

past.

562

Similarly, the ECJ's holding in Hauer56 3 does not provide
support for its holding in Bosphorus because the restriction on
vine plantings in Hauerwas for a definite, temporary period and
the restriction was reasonably and directly related to the goal of

557. Sporrong, 1 73, 5 E.H.R.R. at 54.
558. See supra notes 444-49 and accompanying text (discussing economic effects of
impounding on Bosphorus).
559. Decision of CHR, Air Canada,20 E.H.R.R. at 176, 148; see supra notes 232-53
and accompanying text (discussing CHR's holding in Air Canada that seizure of commercial aircraft on which authorities found cannabis resin, and immediate imposition
of fine, did not violate airline's property rights).
560. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text (discussing seizure of aircraft in
Air Canada).
561. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text (discussing facts surrounding
holding of aircraft in Air Canada).
562. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (discussing potential jurisdictional conflict between European Community and Convention's respective systems of
law and ECJ's response of following CHR and Human Rights Commission interpretations of Convention).
563. See supra notes 274-96 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's holding in
Hauer that EC regulation temporarily restricting planting of vines did not violate right
to property).
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restructuring the wine market. 564 War and international politics
are indefinite by nature. In Bosphorus, the length of the application of Regulation 990/93, although presumably temporary, was
for all purposes indefinite because the goal of the Regulation
was inextricably tied to the existence of the conflict in Bosnia.5 6
Further, the impounding measure was not reasonably related to
the aim of Regulation 990/93, concretely conceived to deny Yugoslavian entities recourse to aircrafts that they could use in the
war. As the Irish High Court held in its judgment,5 6 6 the impounding of the aircraft was not reasonably related to the Regulation's aim.
2. Less Intrusive Means
In addition to requiring a measure to be reasonably related
to its objective,5 67 the principle of proportionality also states that
a measure must be the least intrusive way to accomplish the desired objective 5" and, therefore, the existence of less intrusive
alternatives to impounding in the Bosphorus case violates proportionality. When the Council passed Regulation 990/93 in 1993,
the Annex to Council Regulation 1432/92 was already in force,
providing for the denial of permission to any aircraft to take off
from, land in, or fly over EC territory if it was bound for or had
taken off from Yugoslavia.56 9 The possibility that Bosphorus
could return the aircraft toJAT due to the lease's termination or
for any other reason, thus, was covered by EC legislation in force
564. See supra notes 275-80 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on
planting in Hauer).

565. See supra notes 398-400 and accompanying text (discussing connection of purpose of Regulation 990/93 with war in Bosnia).
566. See Bosphorus, [1994] I.L.R.M. at 560,,[1994] 3 C.M.L.R at 472 (holding that

impounding of Bosphorus' aircraft was disproportionate and, thus, unauthorized).
567. Bermann, supra note 105, at 386.

568. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing principle of proportionality in Community law).

569. Council Regulation 1432/92, supra note 11, Annex, O.J L 151/4, at 6 (1992).
The Annex to Council Regulation 1432/92 provided:
Permission shall be denied to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly
the territory of the Community if it is destined to land in or has taken off from
the territory of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, unless the particular
flight has been approved.., by the Committee established by Security Council
Resolution 724 (1991).
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at the time of the enactment of Regulation 990/93.570 Simply
noting or strengthening the Annex's provision could have prevented Yugoslavian entities from obtaining recourse to aircraft
outside of Yugoslavia less intrusively than the impounding provision of Article 8.
B. The Language of Regulation 990/93 was not Sufficiently Clear to
Justify InterpretingRegulation 990/93 as Applying to the
Bosphorus Aircraft
The language of Regulation 990/93 was not sufficiently
clear to justify the conclusion that it was meant to apply to Bosphorus' aircraft. It is unclear whether the use in Article 8 of the
phrase majority or controlling interest refers to an ownership interest or a leasehold.5 71 Given this ambiguity, the ECJ should
have given Bosphorus' interests priority over those of the European Community, as natural law theory would support requiring
states to have clear textual authority in order to confiscate individuals' property.
1. The Language of Regulation 990/93 Lacked Sufficient
Clarity to Justify the Impounding of Bosphorus'
Aircraft
In Bosphorus, the ECJ incorrectly concluded that Article 8 of
Regulation 990/93 applied to Bosphorus's aircraft merely because Article 8 did not expressly exclude the aircraft from its
scope. The ECJ interpreted Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 by
analyzing its language.5 7 In support of its analysis, the ECJ referred to Paragraph 24 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 820
of 1993.Y' The ECJ's basic approach in interpreting Article 8
was to attempt to prove that nothing in the language of Article 8
precluded the conclusion that it covered Bosphorus' aircraft.
The ECJ, thus, concluded that Bosphorus' aircraft fell under
570. See id. (setting forth details of restrictions on air travel concerning EC territory and Yugoslavia).
571. See Council Regulation 990/93, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. L 102/14, at 16
(1993) (providing for impounding of aircrafts "in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) . . ").
572. See Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3983-85,
11-18, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 29394 (focusing on wording of Article 8 of Regulation 990/93).
573. See id. (interpreting Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 by analyzing Paragraph 24
of Resolution 820).
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that impounding provision.5 7 4
In its decision, the ECJ was not able to identify anything in
the language of Article 8 or Paragraph 24 that was definite and
clear enough to establish an intention that Article 8 cover Bosphorus' aircraft. Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 provided for the
impounding of any aircraft in which a Yugoslavian entity held a
majority or controlling interest. 7 5 JAT owned the aircraft that
Bosphorus, a Turkish company, was leasing at the time of the
impounding.5 76 The ECJ pointed out that nothing in Article 8
of Regulation 990/93 endorsed a distinction between ownership
and day-to-day control and operation.5 7 7 The lack of such an
express distinction in Article 8 does not further the ECJ's position, however, for the actual language at issue is the phrase majority or controlling interest, 578 which in itself suggests day-to-day
control and operation as much as it does ownership. The same
problem plagues the ECJ's observation that nothing in the language of Article 8 stated that the Regulation did not apply to an
aircraft in the situation of Bosphorus' .5 7 That the wording of
Article 8 does not rule out the application of Article 8 to Bosphorus' aircraft does not justify the conclusion that the Regulation
applies to it.
Similarly, the ECJ's argument that the term interest does
574. Id. at 1-3987, 27, at 296.
575. Council Regulation 990/93, supra note 11, art. 8, O.J. L 102/14, at 16 (1993).
Article 8 stated, "[a]ll vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be impounded by
the competent authorities of the Member States." Id.
576. See supra notes 415-23 and accompanying text (discussing facts concerning
lease between Bosphorus and JAT).
577. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3983, 12, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293. "Nothing
in the wording of the first paragraph of Article 8 of Regulation 990/93 suggests that it is
based on a distinction between ownership of an aircraft on the one hand and its day-today operation and control on the other." Id.
578. Council Regulation No. 990/93, supra note 11, art. 8, OJ. L 102/14, at 16
(1993). Article 8 states:
All vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in which a majority or
controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be impounded by the competent authorities of the Member States.
579. Bosphorus, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3983, 1 12, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293. The ECJ
wrote, "[nior is it anywhere stated in (Article 8] that it is not applicable to an aircraft
owned by a person or undertaking based in or operating from the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia if that person or undertaking does not have day-to-day operation and control
of the aircraft." Id.
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not exclude ownership as a determining criterion for impounding580 merely shows that the ECJ's position is not rendered illegitimate by the Regulation's language. In addition, the
ECJ claimed that the word majority, which Paragraph 24 of Resolution 820 employs in conjunction with the term interest, unambiguously implies the notion of ownership.58 ' The ECJ does not
provide the support or argument that its crucial application of
this conception of the term majority warrants.
2. In Light of the Lack of Clarity of Article 8 of Regulation
990/93, the ECJ should have given Bosphorus'
Interest Priority over that of the European
Community
Interpretation of measures bearing on property rights
should begin with a narrow construction and justify each increase in range as it proceeds, for only then will these rights receive the protection they deserve. The ECJ's approach to the
interpretation of Article 8 is the reverse of the just approach,
however, for the ECJ began by arguing against a narrow construction of Article 8 and then proceeded to find outer limits to
its meaning that were merely plausible. For-example, the ECJ
argued that the wording of Article 8 and Paragraph 24 did not
rule out the conclusion that Article 8 covered Bosphorus' air1 2 In addition, the ECJ offered in support of its conclusion
craft.58
the observation that most of the language versions of Article 8
employ terms clearly connoting ownership and that Article 8
provides that owners of impounded aircrafts must bear the expenses of impounding.585 In contrast to the ECJ's method of
interpretation, a conservative approach to interpreting acts that
limit a right as important as the right to property is consistent
with the natural law principle that individuals' interests have priority over those of states. 58 4 No matter how important the public
15, (1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 294. The ECJ argued, "[tihe word
580. Id. at 1-3984,
'interest' in Paragraph 24 cannot, on any view, exclude ownership as a determining
criterion impounding." Id.
581. Id. "Moreover, [the word 'interest'] is used in that paragraph in conjunction
with the word 'majority', which clearly implies the concept of ownership." Id.

12-16, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 293-94 (analyzing language
582. See id. at 1-3983-84,
of Paragraph 24 of Resolution 820 and Article 8 of Regulation 990/93).
583. Id. at 1-3984, 16, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 294.
584. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text (discussing in property rights
context, natural law principle that individuals have inherent priority over states).
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interest, states should only impound an item of property if the
measures providing for impoundings clearly refer to the type of
property in question. Otherwise, states could extend their
power to types of property that the measures did not intend to
be subject to impounding.
CONCLUSION
The importance of the abstract goal of the U.N. and EC embargoes on Yugoslavia did not justify the ECJ's disregard of the
property rights of innocent persons or businesses that had no
connection to Yugoslavia or the war in Bosnia except for their
lease of property owned by a Yugoslavian entity. In the Bosphorus
case, the ECJ conceived the general interest driving the enactment of Regulation 990/93 so abstractly that one could find virtually any measure to be reasonably related to the goal of promoting that interest, thus, ensuring that its upholding of the impounding of Bosphorus's aircraft satisfied the reasonableness
requirement of the principle of proportionality. In addition, the
ECJ's holding ignored the lack of clear textual basis for the impounding and that EC law already contained less intrusive
means of preventing Yugoslavian circumvention of the embargo.
The ECJ thus neglected to recognize the property rights violation that the impounding had effected, and, therefore, the ECJ
should refrain from following its Bosphorus decision in the future.

